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 The collapse of the Enron Corporation was spectacular for its 
scale and its suddenness—$70 billion of shareholder value, held by 
Enron employees in their 401(k) plans and by other working people 
through their pension plans and mutual funds, as well as by other 
individual and institutional investors, wiped out in less than a year. 
After the collapse came the inevitable accusations, many leveled at 
Enron’s accounting firm, Arthur Andersen L.L.P.,1 for scheming with 
Enron executives to set up the rococo structure of off-the-books part-
nerships and other accounting gimmicks that concealed Enron’s im-
plausible and ultimately untenable financial condition, and for re-
porting nothing amiss in its annual audits of Enron’s financial 
statements. When Enron restated its earnings for the past five years 
to recognize $600 million in losses, the irony of Andersen’s prescribed 
assurance that the Enron financial statements it audited “present 
fairly, in all material respects” the company’s financial condition2 
was only surpassed by the near self-parody of the firm’s maxim 
taught to firm founder Arthur Andersen by his Norwegian mother: 
                                                                                                                      
 ∗ Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden. My 
thanks to Steve Brill for his assistance. 
 1. For its role in the Enron scandal, Arthur Andersen was convicted of obstruction of 
justice in June 2002 and officially ended its public auditing business on August 31, 2002. 
Karen Robinson-Jacobs, Andersen Says Goodbye to Accounting, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2002, 
at C1.  
 2.  Richard W. Stevenson & Jeff Gerth, Web of Safeguards Failed as Enron Fell; In-
side and Out, Signals Went Unheeded, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, at 1.  
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“Think straight, talk straight.”3 
 After the collapse came the accusations, and after the accusations 
came the lawsuits.4 In this respect, neither Enron nor Arthur Ander-
sen are unique. In March 2002, Andersen agreed to pay $217 million 
to settle suits arising from its role as auditor of the Baptist Founda-
tion of Arizona, investors in which were bilked by sham transactions 
that hid massive losses.5 Also, Andersen paid $110 million to settle 
suits arising from its audit of Sunbeam during the reign of CEO 
“Chainsaw Al” Dunlap, and $75 million to settle a suit brought by 
Waste Management, Inc., in 1998.6 Ernst & Young paid more than 
$335 million for its role in the Cendant Corporation debacle.7  
 Even more recently, AOL Time Warner, Inc., has made a down-
ward adjustment of $190 million for the past two years of revenues,8 
Tyco International has admitted that “aggressive accounting” exag-
gerated its 2002 earnings by almost $400 million,9 Xerox Corporation 
has restated revenues since 1997 by $6.4 billion,10 WorldCom, Inc., 
has repeatedly restated earnings to recognize false profits currently 
totaling $7.2 billion, with the potential to exceed $9 billion,11 and Rite 
Aid Corp. executives have been charged with overstating earnings in 
the 1990s by $1.6 billion.12 Between 1998 and March 2002, 233 public 
companies restated earnings, correcting statements which had been 
attested to by their accountants.13 And so on. 
 The potential liability of accountants to investors, lenders, and 
others who rely on their audit reports is not only restricted to Big 
Five accounting firms and their huge corporate clients. In the more 
                                                                                                                      
 3. BARBARA LEY TOFFLER, FINAL ACCOUNTING: AMBITION, GREED, AND THE FALL OF 
ARTHUR ANDERSEN 9, 12-13 (2003). 
 4. Several class actions have already been filed against Andersen. Greg Farrell, En-
ron Troubles Could Extend to Arthur Andersen, USA TODAY, Dec. 7, 2001, at B7; Kevin 
Moran, Firm Alleges Andersen Conspiracy: American National Says Enron Auditor Lied, 
HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 3, 2002, at Business 1. 
 5. Jonathan D. Glater, Auditor to Pay $217 Million to Settle Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
2, 2002, at C1. 
 6. Carolyn Aldred, Auditors’ E&O Costs Add Up, BUS. INS., Feb. 4, 2002, at 3; Wil-
liam Greider, Crime in the Suites, THE NATION, Feb. 4, 2002, at 11, 12.  
 7. Aldred, supra note 6, at 32. 
 8. Martin Peers & Julia Angwin, AOL to Restate Two Years of Results: Questionable 
Transactions in Advertising Continue to Plague Media Company, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 
2002, at A3. 
 9. Kevin McCoy, Tyco Acknowledges More Accounting Tricks, USA TODAY, Dec. 31, 
2002, at B3. 
 10. Kathleen Day, Xerox Restates 5 Years of Revenue: ‘97-‘01 Figures Were Off by $6.4 
Billion, WASH. POST, June 29, 2002, at A1. 
 11. Deborah Solomon & Jared Sandberg, Worldcom’s False Profits Climb: Telecom 
Firm’s Latest Tally May Exceed $9 Billion; SEC Files More Charges, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 
2002, at A3.  
 12. Scott Kilman, Rite Aid Ex-Officials Charged in Accounting-Fraud Probe, WALL ST. 
J., June 24, 2002, at A2.  
 13. Joseph Nocera, Who’s to Blame?, MONEY, Mar. 2002, at 79, 80. 
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prosaic Walpert, Smullian & Blumenthal, P.A. v. Katz, for example, 
the tragically familiar failure of Magnetics, Inc., a family printing 
supplies and press repair business, sparked a suit by George Katz, 
the retired owner who had passed the business to his wife and sons, 
against the Baltimore accounting firm that allegedly had negligently 
audited the business’s financial statements, failing to discover in-
flated inventory and accounts receivable.14 There are scores, if not 
hundreds, of reported cases where the consequences of economic cy-
cles and business failures lead to a search for a solvent party on 
which to attach a claim; often an accountant is left holding the bag.15 
 This Article first presents a comprehensive description of the law 
of auditor liability.16 It begins by summarizing the audit process and 
the history of auditor liability.17 An early Cardozo opinion, Ultra-
mares Corp. v. Touche,18 sets out an argument and a standard for 
limited liability that is still important.19 The influence of that deci-
sion contributed to a bar on liability until the 1960s, when liability 
expanded under the influence of more general developments in tort 
law.20  
 The Article then describes the state of the law in every jurisdic-
                                                                                                                      
 14. 762 A.2d 582 (Md. 2000). 
 15. Nor is the problem limited to the United States. For a review of the law through-
out the common law countries, see Carl Pacini et al., The International Legal Environment 
for Information Systems Reliability Assurance Services: The CPA/CA Systrust, 105 COM. 
L.J. 351, 361-80 (2000). 
 16. The Article focuses on the liability of accountants in their role as auditors. “Ac-
countant” and “auditor” are used interchangeably throughout. For information on the li-
ability of accountants in non-audit situations, see JAY M. FEINMAN, PROFESSIONAL 
LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES 138-39 (2000) [hereinafter FEINMAN, THIRD PARTIES]. The lit-
erature on auditor liability is expansive. See, e.g., ALI-ABA, COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, 
ACCOUNTANTS’ LIABILITY (2001); JAY M. FEINMAN, ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE: LIABILITY OF 
PROFESSIONALS AND BUSINESSES TO THIRD PARTIES FOR ECONOMIC LOSS 211-74 (1995) 
[hereinafter FEINMAN, ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE]; FEINMAN, THIRD PARTIES, supra, at 115-
46; Christopher Allegaert & Daniel Tinkelman, Reconsidering the “Lack of Duty” Defense to 
State Auditor Negligence Claims, 25 J. CORP. L. 489 (2000); Victor P. Goldberg, Account-
able Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability Necessary?, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 295 (1988); Willis 
W. Hagen II, Accountants’ Common Law Negligence Liability to Third Parties, 1988 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 181; Gary Lawson & Tamara Mattison, A Tale of Two Professions: 
The Third-Party Liability of Accountants and Attorneys for Negligent Misrepresentation, 52 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1309 (1991); Jodie B. Scherl, Evolution of Auditor Liability to Noncontractual 
Third Parties: Balancing the Equities and Weighing the Consequences, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 
255 (1994); John A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Re-
form, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1929 (1988); Roger J. Buffington, Note, A Proposed Standard of 
Common Law Liability for the Public Accounting Profession, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 485 
(1997).  
 17. For more discussion of these topics, see FEINMAN, ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE, supra 
note 16; FEINMAN, THIRD PARTIES, supra note 16. 
 18. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931). 
 19. FEINMAN, THIRD PARTIES, supra note 16, at 115.  
 20. See id. at 118. 
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tion.21 Auditor liability is a particularly interesting doctrinal problem 
because of the diversity of approaches to liability. A few states still 
require that a third party be in privity or a similarly close relation-
ship with the auditor to recover. Several others allow any foreseeably 
injured party to recover. Most states have taken a middle ground by 
adopting the negligent misrepresentation standard of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, section 552. That standard, however, is nota-
bly diffuse, so courts applying it still range from a near privity re-
quirement to a foreseeability test. 
 The diversity of approaches among the jurisdictions inevitably 
seeks resolution—a resolution that would provide the “correct an-
swer” or the “better rule.” This Article provides neither of those. It 
does, however, frame the issue in several ways that make the process 
of selecting an answer or rule more accessible. The Article lays out 
the policy analysis of auditor liability. The analysis begins with con-
sensus treatment of a paradigm case of liability, but then splits into 
two approaches that reach different results in situations beyond the 
paradigm case. The Article surveys empirical research on auditor li-
ability, but finds no resolution of the policy conflict there. Finally, the 
Article relates the auditor liability issue to broader questions in 
modern private law. 
I.   THE CONTEXT: AUDITING AND THE HISTORY OF AUDITOR LIABILITY 
A.   Auditing 
 Accountants perform a variety of functions for their clients,22 but 
only a narrow range of situations give rise to actions by third parties. 
The great majority of reported cases concern accountants in the per-
formance of their auditing function, with a few cases arising from 
compilation or review engagements, or the provision of tax-planning 
                                                                                                                      
 21. The Article’s focus is on the liability of auditors at common law, or under statu-
tory substitutes for the common law. Other liability may rest on the federal or state securi-
ties laws. For a review of liability under the securities laws, see Richard P. Swanson, Theo-
ries of Liability, in ALI-ABA, COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, ACCOUNTANTS’ LIABILITY 37 
(2000). 
 22. A useful introduction to accounting from the lawyer’s perspective is provided by 
the annual symposia of the Practicing Law Institute. E.g., PRACTISING LAW INST., BASICS 
OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE: WHAT EVERY PRACTICING LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW (1998). 
 The expansion of accountants into consulting and other areas raises questions of their 
independence as auditors and has been controversial. See Tamar Frankel, Accountants’ In-
dependence: The Recent Dilemma, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 261. In 2000, Arthur Ander-
sen spun off its consulting business, now known as Accenture, although that action was 
more a product of financial conflicts between the two halves of the firm than of concern 
over auditor independence. The other Big Five accounting firms have stated their intention 
to do the same. Jeremy Kahn, Deloitte Restates Its Case, FORTUNE, Apr. 29, 2002, at 64, 65. 




 An audit is a systematic, objective examination of a company’s fi-
nancial statements.24 As accountants frequently point out in debates 
about liability, the company, not the accountant, prepares the finan-
cial statements.25 The purpose of an audit is to determine if the 
statements fairly present the financial condition of the company by 
determining that they have been prepared in accordance with Gen-
erally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), applied on a consis-
tent basis. The Auditing Standards Board of the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) promulgates Generally Ac-
cepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) and the interpretive Statements 
on Auditing Standards (SAS) that govern the conduct of audits.26 
 After concluding the audit, the auditor issues its report. The re-
port expresses the auditor’s independent, professional opinion about 
the fairness of the financial statements and, depending on the results 
of the audit, may be one of several kinds: 
 An unqualified opinion states that the accountant followed 
GAAS and that the financial statements fairly present the finan-
cial condition of the company in accordance with GAAP. An un-
qualified opinion may sometimes contain explanatory language, as 
when the company has changed its accounting practice or when 
there is an unresolved uncertainty, such as significant pending 
litigation. As a practical matter, an unqualified opinion is almost a 
necessary result of an audit of large, publicly-held companies, and 
of smaller companies when the audit is needed to satisfy lenders or 
investors. If the auditor discovers discrepancies that may require a 
qualified report, the auditor and the client often will discuss, nego-
tiate, and attempt to remedy the difficulties.  
 A qualified opinion states exceptions to the observance of GAAS, 
where the scope of the audit is limited or the auditor is unable to 
obtain necessary information, or to the fairness of the statements 
in accordance with GAAP, when the principles have not been ob-
served or when not all necessary disclosures have been made.  
                                                                                                                      
 23. Two specially-defined non-audit services are compilation and review. A compila-
tion is an unaudited presentation by the accountant of financial statements, based on in-
formation provided by the client, which represents no assurances by the accountant. In a 
review, the accountant provides only limited assurance that the financial statements do 
not deviate materially from generally accepted accounting principles—a much lower level 
of assurance than is provided in an audit report. Accountants also provide tax and estate 
planning and prepare tax returns. For a discussion of the law concerning non-audit ser-
vices, see FEINMAN, THIRD PARTIES, supra note 16, at 138-39. 
 24. See LARRY P. BAILEY, MILLER GAAS Guide 3-6 (Aspen Law & Bus. 2002); 
HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING § B1.01 (Frank C. Minter et al. eds., 2000). 
 25. In some cases, however, as with Enron, the accountant previously retained to as-
sist in the design of the company’s internal accounting procedures will produce the finan-
cial statements. Stevenson & Gerth, supra note 2. 
 26. See BAILEY, supra note 24, at 4. The AICPA owes no duty to third parties in the 
promulgation of its auditing standards. Waters v. Autuori, 676 A.2d 357, 362 (Conn. 1996). 
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 An adverse opinion states that the financial statements are not 
fairly stated in conformity with GAAP. 
 A disclaimer of opinion is not an opinion at all; rather, the ac-
countant states that the scope of the audit was not sufficient to 
enable it to render an opinion.27 
 Auditing is a mix of judgment and technique which may result in 
certain pitfalls. Auditors can make seemingly reasonable judgments, 
but third parties who later rely on the audit may come to question 
these judgments. Auditors also may misinterpret either GAAS or 
GAAP, carry out the audit improperly, or fail to detect fraud by the 
client in preparing the financial statements or in the underlying 
transactions. Finally, auditors can make errors in failing to discover 
or explain that the financial statements do not fairly represent the 
client’s position.28 
B.   The History of Auditor Liability 
 The history of accountant liability is made up of two or two-and-
one-half stages. In the first stage, which began in the late nineteenth 
century and extended through the 1950s, restrictive liability rules 
made it virtually impossible for a third party to recover for harm 
caused by a negligent audit. In the second stage, which began in the 
1950s and has continued to the present, the traditional doctrines 
came under attack and liability increased, particularly through the 
expansion of the law of negligence and negligent misrepresentation. 
The increase of liability has not been uniform, however, and has been 
contested, in some jurisdictions, on some facts, and, particularly in 
the past fifteen years, by increasingly-conservative courts.29 
 The foundation for the application of the narrow doctrine of priv-
ity in economic loss cases generally was the United States Supreme 
Court’s 1879 decision in Savings Bank v. Ward.30 The case involved 
an action by a bank which lent money for the purchase of real estate 
in reliance on a title report prepared by the defendant lawyer.31 The 
court cited the classic English case of Winterbottom v. Wright32 for 
the fear of the “absurd consequences” of indeterminate liability that 
would ensue if a third party action was allowed.33 Accordingly, the 
court established the rule that a third party not in privity was barred 
from recovering for economic loss.34 
                                                                                                                      
 27. See BAILEY, supra note 24, at 346-80. 
 28. KENT E. ST. PIERRE, AUDITOR RISK AND LEGAL LIABILITY 8-10, 25-41 (1983). 
 29. See, e.g., Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992); infra note 89.  
 30. 100 U.S. 195 (1879). 
 31. Id. at 195-98. 
 32. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). 
 33. Savings Bank, 100 U.S. at 203. 
 34. Id. 
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 Savings Bank v. Ward quickly established the privity bar. Some 
sixteen years after Savings Bank, the California Supreme Court as-
serted that the “overwhelming weight of authority” supported the 
doctrine.35 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in the early accountant 
liability case of Landell v. Lybrand, applied the same rule developed 
in Savings Bank to bar an action by the purchaser of stock in a com-
pany against the accountant that had prepared its financial state-
ments.36 
 Over time, courts eroded the requirement of privity in personal in-
jury cases, particularly those involving manufactured products. The 
decisive case was MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., in which Cardozo’s 
opinion substituted a rule of foreseeability for the privity bar.37 In a 
pair of important cases, the New York Court of Appeals first raised 
the possibility of extending that analysis to economic loss cases and 
then foreclosed that possibility, leaving the privity rule substantially 
intact.38 
 In the first of these two cases, Glanzer v. Shepard, the court im-
posed liability for economic loss caused to a purchaser of beans when 
the bean weigher, under contract to the seller, certified an erroneous 
weight for the beans.39 Because the “end and aim” of the transaction 
was to provide a service to the buyer, the buyer had an action against 
the weigher either for the negligent performance of its service or as 
the third party beneficiary of the weigher’s contract with the seller.40 
 In Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, the court recognized that “[t]he as-
sault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace” in 
tort cases involving personal injury and in contract law through the 
widening of third party beneficiary liability.41 The court refused, 
however, to extend the foreseeability principle of MacPherson to eco-
nomic losses caused by an auditor’s neglect, and it limited Glanzer’s 
“end and aim” concept to cases in which there was a connection be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant that was the equivalent of priv-
                                                                                                                      
 35. Buckley v. Gray, 42 P. 900, 900 (Cal. 1895), overruled by Biakanja v. Irving, 320 
P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958). 
 36. Landell v. Lybrand, 107 A. 783, 783 (Pa. 1919):  
 There were no contractual relations between the plaintiff and defendants, and, 
if there is any liability from them to him, it must arise out of some breach of duty, 
for there is no averment that they made the report with intent to deceive him. 
The averment in the statement of claim is that the defendants were careless and 
negligent in making their report; but the plaintiff was a stranger to them and to 
it, and, as no duty rested upon them to him, they cannot be guilty of any negli-
gence of which he can complain. 
 37. 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916). 
 38. Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 
N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931). 
 39. 135 N.E. at 275. 
 40. Id. at 275-76. 
 41. 174 N.E. at 445. 
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 In Ultramares, the defendants, Touche, Niven & Co., had pre-
pared and certified a balance sheet for Fred Stern & Co., an importer 
and seller of rubber, as it had for several years before.43 On this occa-
sion, Touche supplied Stern with thirty-two copies of the certified 
balance sheet knowing that Stern would provide them to banks, 
creditors, and others in the ordinary course of its business.44 Ultra-
mares, a factor, provided financing to Stern in reliance on the bal-
ance sheet prepared by Touche.45 Because the principals of Stern had 
falsified the company’s accounts receivable, the business collapsed, 
resulting in a loss to Ultramares.46  
 The court interpreted Glanzer to be a case in which “[t]he bond 
[between the bean weigher and the third-party buyer] was so close as 
to approach that of privity, if not completely one with it.”47 Indeed, 
the same result would have been reached in Glanzer through the ap-
plication of third party beneficiary law as through the law of negli-
gence. In Ultramares, however, there was no such bond because the 
service rendered by the defendant was primarily for the benefit of 
Stern, its contracting partner, not Ultramares.48 
 The court characterized Ultramares, unlike Glanzer, as a case in-
volving a misrepresentation rather than a service.49 Accordingly, the 
issue was what “liability attaches to the circulation of a thought or a 
release of the explosive power resident in words.”50 The implications 
of imposing such liability would have been catastrophic. Liability 
would extend to other professions and businesses, such as attorneys 
and title abstracters, and the liability would be immense and uncer-
tain.51 In Cardozo’s cogent aphorism: “If liability for negligence ex-
ists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or for-
gery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants 
to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time 
to an indeterminate class.”52 
 The policies stated in Ultramares set the standard for accountant 
liability for the next third of a century. Until the late 1950s, there 
were only occasional criticisms of and exceptions to the approach, 
and these were never generalized or widely adopted. Eventually, 
                                                                                                                      
 42. Id. at 445-47. 
 43. Id. at 442. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 443. 
 46. Id. at 442-43. 
 47. Id. at 446. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 446-48. 
 50. Id. at 445. 
 51. Id. at 448.  
 52. Id. at 444. 
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however, courts and commentators mounted a series of challenges 
that resulted in many jurisdictions moving away from the traditional 
approach in significant respects.  
 The most noteworthy development was the rise of a general con-
cept of negligence. A central development in modern tort law was “a 
veritable ground swell in the law of negligence that pushed liability 
for physical injuries toward the full extent of what was foreseeable 
and shattered ancient barriers to recovery based on limitations asso-
ciated with privity of contract and similar restrictive concepts.”53 In 
third-party liability cases, this development was initially driven by 
the implementation of a new standard for determining whether a 
duty to exercise reasonable care exists on a particular set of facts, of-
ten referred to as the “balance of factors test.”54 
 The balance of factors test was formulated in Biakanja v. Irving, 
in which the would-be beneficiary of a will failed to receive the prop-
erty which had been devised to her because of improper attestation of 
the testator’s will under the supervision of the defendant notary pub-
lic.55 The central issue in the case was whether the defendant notary 
public owed a duty to the plaintiff, with whom it was not in privity.56 
The court formulated a new standard to answer this question:  
 The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will 
be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy 
and involves the balancing of various factors, among which are the 
extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, 
the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the 
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between 
the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame 
attached to the defendant’s conduct, and the policy of preventing 
future harm.57 
 In applying these factors, the court found that the purpose of the 
                                                                                                                      
 53. Fleming James, Jr., Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negli-
gence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 47 (1972). 
 54. The standard was originally developed in the context of economic loss cases, but it 
has been applied as a fundamental duty analysis to abolish the traditional categories for 
analyzing the duties a landowner owes to entrants, Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 
564 (Cal. 1968), superceded in part by statute as stated in Mastro v. Petrick, 112 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 185, 189 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), to recognize a claim for emotional distress by a witness to 
an accident, Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968), modified, Thing v. La Chusa, 771 
P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989), to extend to therapists the duty to warn of the dangerous propensity 
of patients, Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), and to recog-
nize an action for loss of spousal consortium, Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 525 P.2d 
669 (Cal. 1974). 
 55. 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958). 
 56. Id. at 18.  
 57. Id. at 19. Courts sometimes vary the elements of the test. See, e.g., Nally v. Grace 
Cmty. Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 956 (Cal. 1988); Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 
(Cal. 1961). 
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transaction was to benefit the plaintiff, the defendant must have 
been aware of the consequence of its negligence, the plaintiff suffered 
its loss because of the negligence, the conduct was blameworthy in 
that it was the unauthorized practice of law, and such conduct should 
be discouraged by providing the plaintiff with a right of action.58 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that the defendant owed a duty to the plain-
tiff.59 
 The second development in the law of torts that led to a signifi-
cant expansion of liability was the growth of the law of negligent 
misrepresentation. In Ultramares, recovery for economic loss caused 
by a negligent misrepresentation was held to be unavailable to a 
party not in privity.60 In the early 1960s, a growing body of scholar-
ship challenged the Ultramares rule, Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
section 552 was drafted, and several important court decisions al-
lowed actions for negligent misrepresentation in various situations.  
 As adopted in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 552 ex-
tended liability to professionals who negligently supplied information 
to known or intended recipients of the information.61 The Reporter’s 
Note states that the rewording of the section was intended “to clarify 
[its] meaning,”62 but the debate in the American Law Institute sug-
gests it was intended to expand liability beyond the Ultramares 
rule.63 
 Coinciding with the drafting of the revised section 552, the first 
accountant liability case to depart from the Ultramares doctrine was 
Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin.64 In this case, a Rhode Island corpora-
tion sought financing from the plaintiff. The plaintiff requested certi-
fied financial statements to assess the financial stability of the corpo-
ration.65 The defendant accountant prepared the statements, which 
incorrectly represented that the corporation was solvent.66 The corpo-
ration went into receivership, and the plaintiff was unable to recover 
                                                                                                                      
 58. Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 19. 
 59. Id. Although the balance of factors test was broadly stated and turned out to be 
revolutionary, the opinion in Biakanja was not out of line with earlier authorities. The 
court reconciled Glanzer and Ultramares by characterizing Glanzer as a case in which the 
end and aim of the transaction was to benefit the plaintiff, id. at 18, and Ultramares as a 
case in which the benefit to the plaintiff was only a collateral consideration of the transac-
tion and the plaintiff’s injury was unforeseeable. Id. at 19. Following that reasoning, on the 
facts in Biakanja, the notary owed the beneficiary a duty because the “end and aim” of the 
transaction between the testator and the defendant was to provide for the passing of the 
estate to the plaintiff. Id. 
 60. 174 N.E. 441, 448 (N.Y. 1931). 
 61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). 
 62. Id. § 552 reporter’s note (1981). 
 63. 42 ALI PROC. 383-93 (1965).  
 64. 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968).  
 65. Id. at 86. 
 66. Id. 
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the full amount it had loaned.67  
 The court noted that no appellate court had ever held an account-
ant liable in negligence to a relying party not in privity, but rejected 
that position.68 Instead, the court asked: 
Why should an innocent reliant party be forced to carry the 
weighty burden of an accountant’s professional malpractice? Isn’t 
the risk of loss more easily distributed and fairly spread by impos-
ing it on the accounting profession, which can pass the cost of in-
suring against the risk onto its customers, who can in turn pass 
the cost onto the entire consuming public? Finally, wouldn’t a rule 
of foreseeability elevate the cautionary techniques of the account-
ing profession? For these reasons it appears to this Court that the 
decision in Ultramares constitutes an unwarranted inroad upon 
the principle that “[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the 
duty to be obeyed.”69 
 While the Rusch Factors court embraced a rule of foreseeability, it 
also concluded that on the facts of the case it need not go that far. 
The facts more closely resembled those of Glanzer than those of Ul-
tramares because the plaintiff was a single party whose reliance was 
actually foreseen by the accountant.70 Therefore, the plaintiff fell 
within the Glanzer principle as redacted in the draft of section 552 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The court held that “an account-
ant should be liable in negligence for careless financial misrepresen-
tations relied upon by actually foreseen and limited classes of per-
sons.”71 
 Following Rusch Factors and the publication of the Restatement, a 
majority of courts rejected the Ultramares rule and allowed recovery 
by third parties against accountants. Many of these courts followed 
section 552 of the Restatement in allowing an action for negligent 
misrepresentation.72 The most dramatic departure came in two cases 
in 1983 that continued the generalization of negligence begun in Bi-
akanja: the New Jersey case of H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler73 and the 
Wisconsin case of Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co.74  
 In Rosenblum, the court applied the recently-developed general 
negligence principle, stating: 
                                                                                                                      
 67. Id. at 87. 
 68. Id. at 90. 
 69. Id. at 91 (quoting Cardozo’s opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 
100 (N.Y. 1928)). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 93. 
 72. See infra note 165.  
 73. 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983), superceded by statute as stated in Finderne Mgmt. Co. v. 
Barrett, 809 A.2d 857 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). The New Jersey legislature subse-
quently adopted a different law. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-25 (West 2003). 
 74. 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983). 
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Unless some policy considerations warrant otherwise, privity 
should not be, and is not, a salutary predicate to prevent recovery. 
Generally, within the outer limits fixed by the court as a matter of 
law, the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the negligent act 
define the duty and should be actionable.75 
In the case of accountants, policy considerations do not warrant lim-
iting liability; indeed, in the court’s view, they favor liability. First, 
the role of the accountant is one of public responsibility, in which the 
accountant serves as “an independent check upon management’s ac-
counting of its stewardship.”76 Second, accountants already are sub-
ject to similar duties, as under the federal securities laws.77 Third, 
the imposition of a duty would require accountants to exercise 
greater care and to insure against losses caused by their neglect.78 
Finally, the duty was not an unlimited one, as demonstrated in the 
rule formulated by the court:  
 When the independent auditor furnishes an opinion with no 
limitation in the certificate as to whom the company may dissemi-
nate the financial statements, he has a duty to all those whom that 
auditor should reasonably foresee as recipients from the company 
of the statements for its proper business purposes, provided that 
the recipients rely on the statements pursuant to those business 
purposes.79 
 One month later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court also applied gen-
eral negligence principles in Citizens State Bank.80 Rejecting the Ul-
tramares rule and Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 552 as too 
restrictive, the court held that liability would attach unless the court, 
after a determination of the facts, found that public policy dictated 
otherwise.81 Some of the public policy factors to be considered include 
the remoteness or fortuity of the injury in relation to the harm, the 
proportionality of the injury to the defendant’s culpability, the rea-
sonableness of the burden placed on the defendant, and the adminis-
trability of the rule because of fraudulent claims or the absence of a 
logical stopping point.82 
 The expansion of liability advocated in Rosenblum and Citizens 
State Bank was not widely followed. As noted, the majority of states 
have opted for the Restatement position, and several states, including 
New Jersey, have adopted legislation limiting liability.83 Two devel-
                                                                                                                      
 75. 461 A.2d at 145. 
 76. Id. at 149 (quoting In re Kerlin, SEC Accounting Release 105 (1966)). 
 77. Id. at 151. 
 78. Id. at 152.  
 79. Id. at 153. 
 80. 335 N.W.2d 361, 365-66 (Wis. 1983). 
 81. Id. at 366. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See infra notes 133-37, 165. 
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opments, in New York and California, have been particularly impor-
tant. Although the Ultramares principle was substantially eroded by 
the generalization of negligence and the expansion of negligent mis-
representation, in New York, its jurisdictional home, it was revital-
ized by the Court of Appeals’ 1985 decision in Credit Alliance Corp. v. 
Arthur Andersen & Co.84 In that case, the court rejected the expan-
sive possibilities of earlier decisions and reaffirmed the policies of Ul-
tramares and Glanzer.85 The court formulated a three-part test that 
would be more precise in application than the “end and aim” lan-
guage of Glanzer, or the “bond approaching privity” standard of Ul-
tramares. Under this test, the defendant owes a duty to the third 
party who relies on its representations only if the following condi-
tions are met: 
(1) [T]he accountants must have been aware that the financial re-
ports were to be used for a particular purpose or purposes;  
(2) in the furtherance of which a known party or parties was in-
tended to rely; and  
(3) there must have been some conduct on the part of the account-
ants linking them to that party or parties, which evinces the ac-
countants’ understanding of that party or parties’ reliance.86 
The third element of the test was particularly important. The court 
emphasized that, in cases such as Glanzer, there was an intimate 
nexus between the bean weigher and the relying third party that was 
the equivalent of a third-party beneficiary relationship.87 In cases 
such as Ultramares, the intimate nexus was missing, so that the 
third party’s use of the information was merely one potential use 
among many others.88 The requirement of some linking conduct or 
nexus between the plaintiff and defendant became the factor that 
most distinguished the New York near privity test from other, more 
expansive standards. 
 Because of New York’s prominence, the Credit Alliance doctrine 
represented an important limitation on the expansion of liability for 
economic negligence. In addition to its application in New York, it 
was adopted by the courts of a few other states,89 and was widely dis-
cussed as a position that had to be considered in formulating a doc-
                                                                                                                      
 84. 483 N.E.2d 110, 118-19 (N.Y. 1985). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 118. 
 87. Id. at 117. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See, e.g., Colonial Bank of Ala. v. Ridley & Schweigert, 551 So. 2d 390, 395 (Ala. 
1989); Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp of Idaho, 772 P.2d 720, 722 (Idaho 1989); 
Thayer v. Hicks, 793 P.2d 784, 789 (Mont. 1990). Subsequently the Alabama Supreme 
Court rejected the privity rule of Colonial Bank of Alabama in favor of the negligence stan-
dard of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 552. Boykin v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 
639 So. 2d 504, 509 (Ala. 1994). 
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trine of liability. By giving credence to the narrow end of the liability 
spectrum, the doctrine had some influence in moderating the courts’ 
move to a general negligence standard. The doctrine also was 
adopted by legislation in a number of states to limit the liability of 
accountants to non-clients.90 
 Of equal importance was the 1992 decision of the California Su-
preme Court in Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.91 As part of a retreat from 
its historic posture of extending liability,92 the court held that a neg-
ligence cause of action was restricted to those parties in privity with 
the accountant, and that a negligent misrepresentation action would 
be available only to those who met the standards of section 552 of the 
Restatement.93 In doing so, the court took two steps to restrict liabil-
ity. First, on the issue of negligence, it effectively supplanted the bal-
ance of factors test with a narrower test, rejecting the foreseeability 
doctrine which had prevailed in California since the Court of Ap-
peals’ much cited decision in International Mortgage Co. v. John P. 
Butler Accountancy Corp.,94 following Rosenblum and Citizens State 
Bank.95 Resurrecting the privity rule, the court held that a third 
party could not sue for an auditor’s negligence.96 Second, on the issue 
of negligent misrepresentation, it applied an extremely narrow in-
terpretation of section 552, practically equating the knowledge re-
quirement of section 552 with the intended beneficiary requirement 
of contract law.97 
 The “intent to benefit” language of the Restatement Second of 
Torts thus creates an objective standard that looks to the specific 
circumstances (e.g., supplier-client engagement and the supplier’s 
communications with the third party) to ascertain whether a sup-
plier has undertaken to inform and guide a third party with re-
spect to an identified transaction or type of transaction.98 
II.   A SURVEY OF AUDITOR LIABILITY 
A.   Characterizing the Action: Negligence or Negligent 
Misrepresentation 
 The plaintiff in an auditor liability case necessarily makes two 
                                                                                                                      
 90. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-26-12 (repealed 2000). 
 91. 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992). 
 92. See Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L. 
REV. 1131 (1995); Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges as Tort Law Un-Makers: Recent Califor-
nia Experience with “New” Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 455 (1999). 
 93. Bily, 834 P.2d at 768-69. 
 94. 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), overruled by Bily, 834 P.2d at 774. 
 95. Bily, 834 P.2d at 771-72. 
 96. Id. at 772. 
 97. See id. at 767, 775 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
 98. Id. at 769-70. 
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claims: that the accountant negligently performed the audit and that 
the audit report communicated to the plaintiff was misleading be-
cause the audit was negligently performed. As a conceptual matter, 
the plaintiff may bring its action either for negligence (for the im-
proper performance of the audit) or for negligent misrepresentation 
(for negligently communicating false information in the report).99 
 The great similarities between negligence and misrepresentation 
make it possible for a court to shift easily from elements or policies of 
one doctrine to the other. In H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, the leading 
case for the use of a general negligence standard in accountant liabil-
ity cases, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that negligence and 
negligent misrepresentation were virtually identical where a false or 
misleading communication results.100 Although the plaintiffs’ claim 
with respect to carelessness in performing an audit was brought in 
negligence, the court noted that the claim could be viewed as 
grounded in negligent misrepresentation for presenting the results of 
the audit.101 Throughout the opinion, the court treats the claim doc-
trinally as one of misrepresentation, but it employs much of the logic 
of the ordinary negligence action—such as foreseeability and public 
policy—in determining whether the action lies.102  
 In contrast to Rosenblum, other courts have distinguished the 
negligence and negligent misrepresentation actions where the char-
acterization of the action may have significant liability conse-
quences.103 In Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland 
(Raritan I),104 the North Carolina Supreme Court emphasized the dif-
                                                                                                                      
 99. A third party beneficiary action also is possible but seldom is brought because the 
requirements are stricter than those of negligence or negligent misrepresentation. See Ri-
ley v. Ameritech Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 762 (E.D. Mich. 2001); Yadlosky v. Grant Thorn-
ton, L.L.P., 120 F. Supp. 2d 622 (E.D. Mich. 2000); Mariani v. Price Waterhouse, 82 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 671 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland 
(Raritan II), 407 S.E.2d 178 (N.C. 1991). But see Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Garrison, Webb & 
Stanaland, P.A., 823 F.2d 434 (11th Cir. 1987); Williams Controls, Inc. v. Parente, 
Randolph, Orlando, Carey & Assocs., 39 F. Supp. 2d 517 (M.D. Pa. 1999); Ward v. Ernst & 
Young, 435 S.E.2d 628 (Va. 1993). 
 100. 461 A.2d 138, 146 (N.J. 1983), superceded by statute as stated in Finderne Mgmt. 
Co. v. Barrett, 809 A.2d 857 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).  
 101. Id. at 142.  
 102. In Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, an attorney liability case, Judge Richard Posner echoed 
this sentiment, stating: “[W]e have great difficulty both in holding [negligence and negli-
gent misrepresentation] apart in our minds and in understanding why the parties are 
quarreling over the exact characterization.” 826 F.2d 1560, 1563 (7th Cir. 1987); see also 
Barrie v. V.P. Exterminators, Inc., 625 So. 2d 1007, 1015 (La. 1993) (applying duty/risk 
analysis to determine duty in misrepresentation cases); Walpert, Smullian & Blumenthal, 
P.A. v. Katz, 762 A.2d 582, 587 (Md. 2000) (stating that negligent misrepresentation is a 
variety of negligence). 
 103. See Tri-Professional Realty, Inc. v. Hillenburg, 669 N.E.2d 1064, 1068-69 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1996) (Indiana courts have not generally recognized negligent misrepresentation, but 
an action for misrepresentation may be brought under a claim of negligence.). 
 104. 367 S.E.2d 609 (N.C. 1988). 
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ference between the foreseeability standard, which defines the scope 
of duty in negligence, and the more limited class of plaintiffs permit-
ted under section 552 of the Restatement: 
[Section 552] prevents extension of liability in situations where the 
accountant “merely knows of the ever-present possibility of . . . ac-
tion in reliance upon [the audited financial statements], on the 
part of anyone to whom it may be repeated.” Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 552, Comment h. As such it balances, more so than the 
other standards, the need to hold accountants to a standard that 
accounts for their contemporary role in the financial world with 
the need to protect them from liability that unreasonably exceeds 
the bounds of their real undertaking.105 
 The California Supreme Court in Bily stressed even more the 
practical desirability of distinguishing the two actions.106 Under neg-
ligence, the court held, only the client (or perhaps a third party bene-
ficiary) can recover.107 For the negligent misrepresentation action, 
however, the court adopted section 552 of the Restatement.108 The 
court made this distinction because of the different statutory bases of 
the two actions in the California Civil Code, and because of the prac-
tical implications of those differences. Chief among these implica-
tions is the effect of the instructions on the jury in each case; the neg-
ligent misrepresentation instructions emphasize, in a way the negli-
gence instructions do not, the necessity of reliance by the plaintiff on 
the auditor’s report.109 
By allowing recovery for negligent misrepresentation (as op-
posed to mere negligence), we emphasize the indispensability of 
justifiable reliance on the statements contained in the report. As 
the jury instructions in this case illustrate, a general negligence 
charge directs attention to defendant’s level of care and compliance 
with professional standards established by expert testimony, as 
opposed to plaintiff’s reliance on a materially false statement made 
by defendant. The reliance element in such an instruction is only 
implicit—it must be argued and considered by the jury as part of 
its evaluation of the causal relationship between defendant’s con-
                                                                                                                      
 105. Id. at 617; see also Standard Chartered P.L.C. v. Price Waterhouse, 945 P.2d 317, 
340-42 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). 
 106. 834 P.2d 745, 768 (Cal. 1992). 
 107. Id. at 767.  
 108. Id. at 769.  
 109. Id. at 772. Other implications concern the statute of limitations. Compare Ventura 
County Nat’l Bank v. Macker, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 418, 419-20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (profes-
sional malpractice statute of limitations), with Barger v. McCoy Hillard & Parks, 488 
S.E.2d 215, 223-24 (N.C. 1997) (negligent misrepresentation statute of limitations); com-
pare Hendricks v. Thornton, 973 S.W.2d 348, 365 (Tex. App. 1998), superceded by statute 
as stated in Prostok v. Browning, No. 05-99-00826-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 2723 (Tex. 
App. Mar. 28, 2003) (discovery rule applies to accounting malpractice claims), with Brown 
v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 856 S.W.2d 742, 746-48 (Tex. App. 1993) (discovery rule does not 
apply to accounting malpractice claims). 
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duct and plaintiff’s injury. In contrast, an instruction based on the 
elements of negligent misrepresentation necessarily and properly 
focuses the jury’s attention on the truth or falsity of the audit re-
port’s representations and plaintiff’s actual and justifiable reliance 
on them. Because the audit report, not the audit itself, is the foun-
dation of the third person’s claim, negligent misrepresentation 
more precisely captures the gravamen of the cause of action and 
more clearly conveys the elements essential to a recovery.110 
 There are, therefore, two doctrinal differences between the actions 
of negligence and negligent misrepresentation.111 First, a misrepre-
sentation action specifically requires that the third party rely on the 
defendant’s misrepresentation,112 while a negligence action does not 
contain that specific requirement. Second, a misrepresentation ac-
tion, as stated in Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 552(2), con-
tains specific limitations on the third parties to whom a duty is owed 
and the types of transactions for which harm suffered is legally cog-
nizable. The concern raised by the North Carolina and California 
courts is whether these limiting factors, especially reliance, are ade-
quately spelled out in the statement of the rules of negligence. These 
concerns are particularly acute when considering the differences in 
jury instructions (although the occasional inattentive court also may 
miss the distinctions). 
 In practice, however, the differences often turn out to be insignifi-
cant because the specific requirements of the misrepresentation ac-
tion are reflected in the way the general requirements of the negli-
gence action are applied. As a practical matter, the reliance require-
ment for misrepresentation often is subsumed within the negligence 
action’s requirement of a causal link between the breach of duty and 
the harm; only by relying on the information can the third party suf-
fer harm as a result of the defendant’s communication. Under either 
doctrine, reliance can be interpreted to require a demonstrable act of 
specific reliance, or it can be more attenuated. Likewise, the limita-
tions on duty in a misrepresentation claim are found within the scope 
of issues considered under the duty analysis in negligence. In apply-
ing either a foreseeability standard or a balance of factors test, courts 
often use the same methods of limiting the scope of duty as those 
embodied in Restatement section 552(2).  
                                                                                                                      
 110. Bily, 834 P.2d at 772 (footnote omitted). 
 111. Texas courts articulate a third difference because of their adoption of a rule of 
privity for negligence cases with an exception for misrepresentation cases. This difference 
is purely formal; liability in a negligence case arises from a breach of professional duty 
owed to a client, but liability in a misrepresentation case is based on a duty to a non-client 
arising from the awareness of the non-client’s reliance. Sec. Investors Prot. Corp. v. Chesh-
ier & Fuller, L.L.P., 262 B.R. 384, 400 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2001); McCamish, Martin, Brown 
& Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. 1999). 
 112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). 
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B.   The Doctrines 
 Whether approaching the accountant liability issue through the 
lens of negligence or negligent misrepresentation, jurisdictions vary 
on the scope of liability. There are three general doctrinal positions 
on the liability rule: the requirement of privity or near privity, the 
foreseeability test, and the group and transaction test of Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, section 552. 
1.   Privity and Near Privity 
 In Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, the New York Court of Appeals es-
tablished near privity as a prerequisite of liability for the negligent 
performance of an audit.113 Although the court recognized that its 
own decisions had removed the privity barrier in the case of physical 
harm to third parties, it retained the barrier with respect to purely 
economic loss arising from misrepresentation.114 The threat of inde-
terminate liability led the court to conclude that liability should be 
limited to those in privity with the defendant or those for whose 
benefit the information is provided.115 In other words, if the third 
party is not in a contractual relationship with the defendant ac-
countant, the “end and aim” of the transaction must have been to 
provide the audit for the third party’s benefit so that, as in Glanzer v. 
Shepard, “[t]he bond was so close as to approach that of privity, if not 
completely one with it.”116 The Ultramares court’s interpretation of 
Glanzer effectively established a rule that only if the third party 
could enforce the defendant’s contract as a third-party beneficiary 
would it be able to bring the action in negligence. 
 State117 and federal courts118 in a number of jurisdictions adhere to 
                                                                                                                      
 113. 174 N.E. 441, 446-48 (N.Y. 1931). 
 114. Id. at 445-48.  
 115. Id. at 446-47.  
 116. Id. at 445-46. 
 117. Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp of Idaho, 772 P.2d 720, 722 (Idaho 1989); 
Thayer v. Hicks, 793 P.2d 784, 789 (Mont. 1990); Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Peat Mar-
wick Main & Co., 597 N.E.2d 1080, 1087 (N.Y. 1992); Ward v. Ernst & Young, 435 S.E.2d 
628, 634 (Va. 1993). 
 118. Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 846 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying Indiana law); 
Toro Co. v. Krouse, Kern & Co., 827 F.2d 155, 160-61 (7th Cir. 1987) (also applying Indiana 
law); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1202 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Delaware law); 
Stephens Indus., Inc. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1971) (applying 
Colorado law); Robertson v. White, 633 F. Supp. 954, 970 (W.D. Ark. 1986) (applying Ar-
kansas law). But see Giant Eagle of Del., Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 892 F. Supp. 676, 690 
(W.D. Pa. 1995) (applying Pennsylvania law, citing conflicting authority); Seedkem, Inc. v. 
Safranek, 466 F. Supp. 340, 343-44 (D. Neb. 1979) (applying Indiana law). Of these cases, 
Toro is the most often cited and the strongest authority. Some of the other cases are of lim-
ited precedential value. McLean is primarily a securities action, but suggests that Dela-
ware courts would follow the Ultramares rule, relying on an old Delaware Chancery deci-
sion, Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 3 A.2d 768 (Del. Ch. 
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the rule that privity or near privity is required between a third party 
and an accountant. New York has remained the leading jurisdiction 
to espouse the view of liability limited to privity or a similar relation-
ship. In a series of cases, the New York Court of Appeals has ex-
plained and modified the Ultramares doctrine in ways that have been 
influential in other jurisdictions. 
 In its leading contemporary opinion, Credit Alliance Corp. v. Ar-
thur Andersen & Co., the New York Court of Appeals formulated a 
three-part test that requires near privity.119 This requirement defines 
a relationship sufficiently narrow for the accountant to avoid inde-
terminate liability and predict the scope of its exposure to liability. 
At the same time, the test aims to provide criteria that are easier to 
apply than the more general formulations in Glanzer and Ultra-
mares.120  
 The Credit Alliance case illustrates the application of this rule. In 
Credit Alliance, an accountant was found not liable to a non-privity 
plaintiff which had loaned money to the accountant’s client in reli-
ance on the accountant’s erroneous audit, a report of which had been 
provided to it by the client.121 Even though the accountant was al-
leged to have actual or constructive knowledge that the client showed 
the report to the lender to induce the loan, there was no allegation 
that the audit was prepared for that particular purpose or that the 
accountant had any direct dealings with the plaintiff.122 Thus, the 
linking conduct required by the third element of the Credit Alliance 
test was lacking.123 
 In the companion case of European American Bank and Trust Co. 
v. Strauhs & Kaye, by contrast, the plaintiff alleged that the ac-
countant was aware that the lender was relying on the accountant’s 
audit in valuing the collateral of its loans and otherwise assessing 
                                                                                                                      
1939). In Stephens and Robertson, the courts declined to depart from the Ultramares rule 
in the absence of strong signals to do so from the state courts.  
 In Williams Controls, Inc. v. Parente, Randolph, Orlando, Carey & Associates, the court 
held that Pennsylvania law requires privity for a negligence action, but allows an action 
for negligent misrepresentation under Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 552. 39 F. 
Supp. 2d 517, 526, 533 (M.D. Pa. 1999). Texas courts take the same position. McCamish, 
Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. 1999). 
 119. 483 N.E.2d 110, 118 (N.Y. 1985). See supra p. 29 (containing three part test); see 
also Westpac Banking Corp. v. Deschamps, 484 N.E.2d 1351, 1352 (N.Y. 1985) (requiring a 
third party claiming harm to demonstrate a relationship or bond with the accountants 
“sufficiently approaching privity” based on “some conduct on the part of the accountants”). 
 120. The Maryland Court of Appeals aptly noted that the requirement of a linking con-
duct furthers the policy of avoiding indeterminate liability by requiring proof that the ac-
countant knew of the plaintiff’s reliance, and therefore knew its liability to exposure. 
Walpert, Smullian & Blumenthal, P.A. v. Katz, 762 A.2d 582, 608 (Md. 2000). This policy 
was expressed in Ultramares as well. 174 N.E. at 447.  
 121. 483 N.E.2d at 111-12, 119-20.  
 122. Id. at 119.  
 123. Id. Arguably, all three required elements were lacking.  
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the financial status of the accountant’s client, the borrower.124 Fur-
ther, the accountant and the lender were in contact with respect to 
the borrower’s affairs over a substantial period of time. They met for 
the purpose of discussing the borrower’s financial condition and the 
lender’s reliance on the accountant’s evaluation. The accountant 
made repeated in-person representations during these meetings 
about the value of the borrower’s assets.125 On these facts, the court 
held that the relationship between the parties was the practical 
equivalent of privity under the three Credit Alliance criteria.126 
 New York courts have applied the criteria rigidly, requiring proof 
that the accountant was retained to further a particular purpose in 
which the third party was involved,127 and that there was an ade-
quate nexus or linking conduct between the accountant and the third 
party.128 In Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick 
Main & Co., for example, during a telephone call from an officer of 
the third party who was lending money to the accountant’s client to 
the accountant’s audit partner, the partner confirmed that the audit 
was correct, that the income figures in the draft audit would be the 
same as in the final report, and that the opinion would be unquali-
fied.129 The court found that even though the accountant may then 
have known of the lender’s reliance, the conduct failed to meet the 
nexus requirement of the third element of the test.130 Moreover, be-
cause the primary aim of obtaining the audit was to meet the normal 
reporting requirements of a public company, there was no claim that 
the accountant was retained to prepare the audit report to enable the 
client to obtain credit, or that the accountant ever specifically agreed 
to prepare the report for the lender’s use.131 
                                                                                                                      
 124. 477 N.Y.S.2d 146, 147 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), aff’d by Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Ar-
thur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985).  
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. at 148. 
 127. See Parrott v. Coopers & Lybrand, L.L.P., 741 N.E.2d 506, 509 (N.Y. 2000). But 
see AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst and Young, 206 F.3d 202, 223 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that 
no-default letters accompanying an audit sufficient to prove accountant’s awareness of in-
vestors’ reliance). 
 128. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. BDO Seidman, L.L.P., 746 N.E.2d 1042, 1048 (N.Y. 
2001); Parrott, 741 N.E.2d at 509; LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 729 
N.Y.S.2d 671, 675 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); see Lampert v. Mahoney, Cohen & Co., 630 
N.Y.S.2d 733, 735 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). 
 129. 597 N.E.2d 1080, 1082 (N.Y. 1992).  
 130. Id. at 1082, 1087.  
 131. Id. at 1086. The conflict between the majority and Judge Hancock’s dissent in this 
case further illustrates the limitations imposed by the Credit Alliance test. Judge Hancock 
emphasized that there had been prior discussions between the accountant and the lender, 
that the accountant knew of negotiations between the lender and client for a new line of 
credit at the time it conducted the audit, that the draft audit report indicated that the cli-
ent was negotiating for a line of credit, and that the lender’s officer telephoned the audit 
partner to confirm certain facts in the audit. Id. at 1092 (Hancock, J., dissenting). In light 
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 Of the jurisdictions that have adopted the requirement that there 
be a relationship approaching privity, nearly all have done so by us-
ing the Credit Alliance test as an appropriate standard.132  
 A few states have adopted the rule of privity or a near substitute 
by statute.133 The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
has promoted legislation of this type in a model statute that closely 
resembles the Credit Alliance test.134 Four states have adopted ver-
                                                                                                                      
of this background, the telephone conversation provided clear evidence of the linking con-
duct required. Id.  
 The Credit Alliance court had not explained what precisely was meant by “some conduct 
by the [accountants] linking them to the party or parties and evincing [the accountants’] 
understanding of [that party or parties’] reliance.” Id. at 1091 (quoting Credit Alliance 
Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, 118 (N.Y. 1985)). Other courts have in-
terpreted this language to require a “showing of some communication or contacts demon-
strating the accountant’s awareness of the third party’s reliance.” Id. In Judge Hancock’s 
view, the Security Pacific majority narrowed the Credit Alliance test by requiring contact 
equivalent to that in European American Bank and by reimposing a requirement equiva-
lent to the third party beneficiary rationale underlying Glanzer. Id. (Hancock, J., dissent-
ing) (citing First Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Monco Agency, 911 F.2d 1053, 1059 (5th Cir. 
1990)); Huang v. Sentinel Gov’t Sec., 709 F. Supp. 1290, 1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). See Ahmed 
v. Trupin, 809 F. Supp. 1100, 1104-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); CMNY Capital, L.P. v. Deloitte & 
Touche, 821 F. Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Hamond v. Marks Shron & Co., 671 N.Y.S.2d 
106 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (finding that a limited partner was not in near privity with ac-
countant retained by the company through a general partner). But see AUSA Life Ins. Co. 
v. Dwyer, 928 F. Supp. 1239, 1253-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (concluding that the absence of di-
rect communication between an accountant and a third party is not fatal to plaintiff’s 
claim where a no-default certificate issued by accountant states it is for the use of a third 
party). 
 132. Twin Mfg. Co. v. Blum, Shapiro & Co., 602 A.2d 1079 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991); 
Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp of Idaho, 772 P.2d 720, 722 (Idaho 1989); 
Walpert, Smullian & Blumenthal, P.A. v. Katz, 762 A.2d 582, 608 (Md. 2000); Thayer v. 
Hicks, 793 P.2d 784, 789 (Mont. 1990). In Thayer, the court adopted a stricter version of 
the Credit Alliance test, noting that the facts of the case would meet even the strictest for-
mulation of the accountant’s duty of care and finding no need to adopt a more liberal stan-
dard “at this time.” Id.  
 133. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-302 (Michie 2003); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
450/30.1 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1-402 (Supp. 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-26a-
602 (Supp. 2002). In addition to these specific statutes, Georgia has a general statutory re-
quirement of privity in actions for economic loss. However, the statute has been inter-
preted not to apply to actions for negligent misrepresentation. See Wood Bros. Constr. Co. 
v. Simons-Eastern Co., 389 S.E.2d 382, 383-84 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). 
 134. The relevant portion of the model statute prohibits actions by parties not in priv-
ity unless: 
The defendant licensee or firm: (1) was aware at the time the engagement was 
undertaken that the financial statements or other information were to be made 
available for use in connection with a specified transaction by the plaintiff who 
was specifically identified to the defendant accountant, (2) was aware that the 
plaintiff intended to rely upon such financial statements or other information in 
connection with the specified transaction, and (3) had direct contact and commu-
nication with the plaintiff and expressed by words or conduct the defendant ac-
countant’s understanding of the reliance on such financial statements or other in-
formation. 
AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, UNIFORM ACCOUNTANCY ACT AND UNIFORM 
ACCOUNTANCY ACT RULES § 20(c)(2) (2002).  
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sions of this statute.135 Four others have adopted statutes of similar 
effect which provide that an accountant is liable in negligence to a 
party in the absence of privity only if the accountant was aware that 
the benefit to a third party was a primary purpose of the client, or if 
the accountant identifies the third party who is intended to rely on 
its work by sending a writing to that effect to both the client and the 
third party.136 Because these latter statutes require that the account-
ant issue a writing identifying the third party who may rely on its 
work when the primary purpose of the work is other than to benefit 
the third party, they give the accountant an effective veto over the 
possibility of third party reliance.137 
2.   Negligence 
 Privity and near privity essentially take accountant liability and 
other third-party liability cases out of the realm of tort law and place 
them within the sphere of contract law, allowing recovery only where 
there is privity or a third-party beneficiary relationship, and under 
the Credit Alliance linking conduct element,138 sometimes not even 
then. An alternative to privity or near privity is to treat these cases 
the same as ordinary negligence cases and apply a rule of liability for 
foreseeable harm. For a moment in the mid-1980s, the foreseeability 
approach appeared promising to courts and scholars, but it has not 
attracted much support since then. 
 The major case on foreseeability in accountant liability cases is 
                                                                                                                      
 135. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1-402 (Supp. 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37.91 (West 2003); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-25 (West 2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-201 (Michie 2001); see 
Monarch Normandy Square Partners v. Normandy Square Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 817 F. 
Supp. 896 (D. Kan. 1993); see also Gillespie v. Seymour, 796 P.2d 1060 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1990) (upholding the Kansas statute under the state constitution). 
 136. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-302 (Michie 2003); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 450/30.1 
(2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2962 (West 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-26a-602 (Supp. 
2002). 
 137. See Riley v. Ameritech Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 762, 773-74 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (cit-
ing Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Shamie, 597 N.W.2d 553 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999)) (holding that 
Act requires that accountant and client give written notice regarding identified third par-
ties and intended use); Yadlosky v. Grant Thornton, L.L.P., 120 F. Supp. 2d 622, 634 (E.D. 
Mich. 2000); Dougherty v. Zimbler, 922 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding that the stat-
ute bars an action for negligent misrepresentation, but not actions for fraud); Endo v. Al-
bertine, 812 F. Supp. 1479 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Robin v. Falbo, 1992 WL 188429, at *8-9 (N.D. 
Ill. 1992) (stating that intent of legislature was to require privity or written notification by 
accountant); Swink v. Ernst & Young, 908 S.W.2d 660, 662-63 (Ark. 1995); Chestnut Corp. 
v. Pestine, Brinati, Gamer, Ltd., 667 N.E.2d 543, 547 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (concluding that, 
under the statute, an accountant owes a duty to a third party only where the accountant is 
aware that a primary intent of client is to benefit a third party and that the accountant’s 
failure to identify the third party in a writing does not preclude that duty); Gillespie v. 
Seymour, 796 P.2d 1060, 1062-63 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990). But see Battenfeld of Am. Holding 
Co. v. Baird, Kurtz & Dobson, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1198 (D. Kan. 1999) (finding that pur-
chaser of corporation met requirements of Kansas statute). 
 138. 483 N.E.2d 110, 118 (N.Y. 1985).  
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the 1983 New Jersey Supreme Court opinion in H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. 
Adler.139 Rosenblum has been widely commented on, but it is no 
longer honored even in its own home, as the New Jersey Legislature 
in 1994 adopted a statute that substituted a near privity test for its 
foreseeability standard.140 
 The Rosenblum court began its analysis with a basic principle of 
tort law: the historical movement away from privity.141 For physical 
and economic injuries from defective products, the New Jersey court 
had discarded privity as a requirement for duty: “Unless some policy 
considerations warrant otherwise, privity should not be, and is not, a 
salutary predicate to prevent recovery. Generally, within the outer 
limits fixed by the court as a matter of law, the reasonably foresee-
able consequences of the negligent act define the duty and should be 
actionable.”142 
 The issue, therefore, is one of policy, and the central policy in this 
area is the important position that the accountant’s report plays in 
networks of accountability. The Rosenblum court looked to account-
ing literature, legal commentary, and federal and state law regulat-
ing accountants, and concluded that the accountant is “a kind of arbi-
ter, interpreter, and umpire” among the competing interests of its 
client, third parties who may rely on its work, and its own profes-
sional responsibility.143 Within this context, liability to third parties 
provides an incentive for accountants to exercise due care. Contrary 
to the view expressed in Ultramares,144 imposition of liability through 
negligent misrepresentation will not have deleterious consequences. 
Accountants are already subject to similar liability under the federal 
securities laws, the risks are insurable, and under the liability rule 
the court formulates, the risks have built-in limits.145 Accordingly, 
the Rosenblum court formulated a liability rule based on the extent 
of reliance that the accountant should foresee: 
 When the independent auditor furnishes an opinion with no 
limitation in the certificate as to whom the company may dissemi-
nate the financial statements, he has a duty to all those whom that 
auditor should reasonably foresee as recipients from the company 
of the statements for its proper business purposes, provided that 
                                                                                                                      
 139. 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983), superceded by statute as stated in Finderne Mgmt. Co. v. 
Barrett, 809 A.2d 857 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). 
 140. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-25 (West 2003). 
 141. 461 A.2d at 142-45.  
 142. Id. at 145. 
 143. Id. at 150. 
 144. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).  
 145. Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 151-52.  
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the recipients rely on the statements pursuant to those business 
purposes.146 
 Foreseeability is certainly a much broader standard than near 
privity, and the application of the court’s rule to the facts of the case 
illustrates the breadth of the holding. Touche Ross & Company had 
audited the financial statements of Giant Stores Corporation during 
the fiscal years ending 1969 through 1972.147 In November 1971, Gi-
ant commenced negotiations with Rosenblum for the acquisition of 
Rosenblum’s businesses in New Jersey.148 The negotiations concluded 
in an agreement in which Rosenblum received Giant stock, with a 
closing in May 1972.149 During the negotiations and merger process, 
Giant made a public offering of common stock in December 1971, the 
prospectus for which included the audits for the four years ending 
January 30, 1971.150 Also, Touche audited Giant’s financial state-
ments for fiscal year 1972, issuing the report in April 1972.151 During 
1973 it was discovered that Giant had manipulated its books; Touche 
withdrew its audit opinion for 1972 and Giant went bankrupt, ren-
dering Rosenblum’s stock worthless.152 
 The court held that Touche knew or should have known that Gi-
ant would use its report for various business purposes, such as secu-
rities offerings and corporate acquisitions.153 Because such uses were 
foreseeable, Touche was liable for its negligence.154 In this case, 
Touche became aware of the merger negotiations, but the court found 
that specific knowledge was not necessary to impose liability.155 All 
that was necessary for imposition of liabilty was that the client, Gi-
ant Stores Corporation, used the report for a proper business purpose 
in the course of which a third party justifiably and foreseeably relied 
on the report.156 
 The Wisconsin Supreme Court followed Rosenblum almost imme-
diately with its decision in Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & 
Co.157 Like the New Jersey court, the Wisconsin court concluded that 
accountant liability cases ought to be decided under ordinary princi-
ples of negligence law.158 Under those principles, “a tortfeasor is fully 
                                                                                                                      
 146. Id. at 153. 
 147. Id. at 140. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 141. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. at 154. 
 154. Id. at 155. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983). 
 158. Id. at 366.  
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liable for all foreseeable consequences of his act except as those con-
sequences are limited by policy factors.”159 The court recognized pub-
lic policy factors that might limit the accountant’s duty, including 
remoteness of the harm, disproportion between the culpability of the 
accountant and the injury, and the floodgates problem. However, the 
court concluded that the application of these factors can only be done 
after a full factual resolution of the case, making it unlikely that an 
accountant can achieve dismissal or summary judgment.160 
 In Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., the 
Mississippi Supreme Court also adopted a foreseeability rule.161 The 
court was precluded from adopting a privity rule by statute,162 and it 
rejected the narrower rule of Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 
552 as arbitrarily preferring foreseen to foreseeable relying parties 
when neither paid for the audit and neither was owed a greater duty 
of care. The Touche court preferred the Rosenblum position because 
of the foreseeable reliance of third parties, the accountant’s capacity 
to distribute the loss, the deterrent effect of imposing liability on the 
accountant, and the fairness of imposing liability on the accountant 
for failing to detect fraud when that is one of the specific functions 
for which the accountant is employed.163 Like the New Jersey and 
Wisconsin courts, the Touche court stated a traditional negligence 
rule as the basis of liability: “[A]n independent auditor is liable to 
reasonably foreseeable users of the audit, who request and receive a 
financial statement from the audited entity for a proper business 
purpose, and who then detrimentally rely on the financial statement, 
suffering a loss, proximately caused by the auditor’s negligence.”164 
3.   Negligent Misrepresentation 
 Privity, near privity, and foreseeability have pockets of adherents 
among the states, but the overwhelming majority of courts have 
adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 552 as the stan-
dard for accountant liability.165 The relevant portion of section 552 
                                                                                                                      
 159. Id.  
 160. Id.  
 161. 514 So. 2d 315, 322-23 (Miss. 1987). 
 162. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-20 (Supp. 1986). 
 163. Touche, 514 So. 2d at 322.  
 164. Id. at 322. 
 165. First Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Monco Agency, Inc., 911 F.2d 1053, 1060 (5th 
Cir. 1990) (applying Louisiana law); Williams Controls, Inc. v. Parente, Randolph, Or-
lando, Carey & Assocs., 39 F. Supp. 2d 517, 529-30 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (applying Pennsylvania 
law); Forcier v. Cardello, 173 B.R. 973, 982-83 (D.R.I. 1994) (applying Rhode Island law); 
Bowers v. Allied Inv. Corp., 822 F. Supp. 835, 839 (D. Me. 1993); Ingram Indus., Inc. v. 
Nowicki, 527 F. Supp. 683, 684 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (applying Kentucky law); Bunge Corp. v. 
Eide, 372 F. Supp. 1058, 1062-63 (D.N.D. 1974) (applying North Dakota law in dictum); 
Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91-93 (D.R.I. 1968) (applying Rhode Island 
law); Colonial Bank of Ala. v. Ridley & Schweigert, 551 So. 2d 390, 394 (Ala. 1989); Stan-
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provides: 
Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others 
 (1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employ-
ment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary in-
terest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their 
business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss 
caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, 
if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or 
communicating the information. 
 (2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Sub-
section (1) is limited to loss suffered 
 (a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose 
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or 
knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and 
 (b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the 
information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or 
in a substantially similar transaction. 
 Courts that have adopted the Restatement rule regard it as pre-
scribing an intermediate standard for liability between privity or 
                                                                                                                      
dard Chartered P.L.C. v. Price Waterhouse, 945 P.2d 317 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); Bily v. Ar-
thur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 757-59 (Cal. 1992); First Fla. Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co., 
558 So. 2d 9, 14-16 (Fla. 1990); Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198, 200 (Ga. 1987); 
Kohala Agric. v. Deloitte & Touche, 949 P.2d 141, 162 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997); Pahre v. Audi-
tor of State, 422 N.W.2d 178, 180 (Iowa 1988) (citing Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395, 403 
(Iowa 1969)); Nycal Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick, L.L.P., 688 N.E.2d 1368, 1372 (Mass. 
1998); Law Offices of Lawrence J. Stockler, P.C. v. Rose, 436 N.W.2d 70, 82 (Mich. 1989); 
Bonhiver v. Graff, 248 N.W.2d 291, 298-99 (Minn. 1976); Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant 
& Co., 451 A.2d 1308, 1312 (N.H. 1982); Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Hol-
land (Raritan I), 367 S.E.2d 609, 617 (N.C. 1988); Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Ly-
brand, 436 N.E.2d 212, 214-15 (Ohio 1982); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 
822 S.W.2d 592, 595 (Tenn. 1991); Blue Bell, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 715 
S.W.2d 408, 411-12 (Tex. App. 1986) (citing Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 
873, 880 (Tex. App. 1971)); Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974) 
(adopting a test equivalent to section 552 of the Restatement); Haberman v. Wash. Pub. 
Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d 1032 (Wash. 1987) modified by 750 P.2d 254 (Wash. 1988), 
and overruled in part by Scott Fetzer Co. v. Weeks, 786 P.2d 265 (Wash. 1990); First Nat’l 
Bank of Bluefield v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310, 313 (W. Va. 1989). 
 The Missouri courts have used their own four-factor version of the California six-factor 
test, Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958), to adopt a standard similar to section 
552 of the Restatement. Lindner Fund v. Abney, 770 S.W.2d 437, 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); 
Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378, 383 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). Be-
cause of its use of the four-factor test, Aluma Kraft is sometimes cited as representing a 
fourth approach to accountant liability, distinguishable from the near-privity test, section 
552 of the Restatement, and the foreseeability standard. See Raritan I, 367 S.E.2d at 615. 
Even though the court’s methodology is distinctive, the liability rule it adopts by using that 
methodology is akin to the Restatement rule. Midamerican Bank & Trust Co. v. Harrison, 
851 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). The Missouri Supreme Court has modified the 
application of this test in an attorney liability case. Donahue v. Shughart, Thomson & Kil-
roy, P.C., 900 S.W.2d 624, 629 (Mo. 1995) (en banc). 
 The situation in Nebraska is unclear. The Nebraska Supreme Court cited First Fla. 
Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9, 14 (Fla. 1990) (adopting section 552 of the Re-
statement), but stated that expansion of liability would occur on “a case-by-case basis.” St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Touche Ross & Co., 507 N.W.2d 275, 280-81 (Neb. 1993). 
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near privity and foreseeability. As the North Carolina Supreme 
Court stated in its much-cited opinion in Raritan I: 
[Section 552] recognizes that liability should extend not only to 
those with whom the accountant is in privity or near privity, but 
also to those persons, or classes of persons, whom he knows and in-
tends will rely on his opinion, or whom he knows his client intends 
will so rely. On the other hand, as the commentary makes clear, it 
prevents extension of liability in situations where the accountant 
“merely knows of the ever-present possibility of repetition to any-
one, and the possibility of action in reliance upon [the audited fi-
nancial statements], on the part of anyone to whom it may be re-
peated.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552, Comment h. As such 
it balances, more so than the other standards, the need to hold ac-
countants to a standard that accounts for their contemporary role 
in the financial world with the need to protect them from liability 
that unreasonably exceeds the bounds of their real undertaking.166 
 Section 552 is best understood as prescribing seven elements of a 
cause of action for negligent misrepresentation: 
(1) The defendant supplies information in the course of its business 
or in a transaction in which it has a pecuniary interest. 
(2) The information is false. 
(3) The defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in obtaining or 
communicating the information. 
(4) The plaintiff justifiably relies on the information, and the reli-
ance causes harm. 
(5) The plaintiff is the person or is within the group for whom the 
defendant intends to supply the information or knows that the re-
cipient of the information intends to supply it. 
(6) The plaintiff relies on the information in a transaction that the 
defendant intends to influence or knows that the recipient of the 
information intends to influence, or in a substantially similar 
transaction. 
(7) The plaintiff suffers pecuniary loss. 
 In accountant liability cases, the requirements that the informa-
tion be supplied in the course of the defendant’s business (element 1) 
and that the plaintiff have suffered pecuniary loss (element 7) are 
easily met. Whether the information supplied in the audit report is 
false (element 2) and whether the accountant exercised reasonable 
care (element 3) are doctrinally simple, though they can present dif-
ficult factual issues.167  
 Issues of causation and reliance (element 4) include whether the 
                                                                                                                      
 166. 367 S.E.2d at 617. See also Kohala, 949 P.2d at 160. 
 167. See Willis W. Hagen II, Certified Public Accountants’ Liability for Malpractice: Ef-
fect of Compliance with GAAP and GAAS, 13 J. CONTEMP. L. 65, 76-89 (1987) (discussing 
factors courts take into account when determining what reasonable care for accountants 
entails). 
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plaintiff has looked to the audit to the exclusion of other sources of 
information.168 Courts generally hold that reliance is sufficient if the 
accountant’s representations contributed to the decision concerning 
the accountant’s client.169 Also, when the relying party has been neg-
ligent itself, that negligence may bar or reduce recovery under con-
tributory or comparative negligence principles.170 
 In some cases, courts merge the causation and reliance require-
ment (element 4) with the knowledge and intent requirements (ele-
ments 5 & 6 respectively). The relationship can be seen when exam-
ining the issue of whether the third party must be injured by direct 
reliance on the auditor’s report itself.171 If the third party receives the 
information originally reported in the financial statements from a 
source other than the statements themselves, some courts have held 
that the reliance is too attenuated,172 while others have allowed the 
cause of action.173 This issue can be framed as whether the plaintiff 
justifiably relied on the audit report (element 4), or whether the 
plaintiff is within the known or intended group (element 5) and 
transaction (element 6). Similarly, whether a qualification or dis-
claimer can limit liability can be seen as a reliance (element 4) or an 
intent (element 5) issue.174 
 The key to section 552 of the Restatement is the double intent and 
knowledge requirement (elements 5 & 6 respectively). The principle 
                                                                                                                      
 168. Cordial v. Ernst & Young, 483 S.E.2d 248, 261-62 (W. Va. 1996). 
 169. Id. 
 170. See ESCA Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 939 P.2d 1228, 1232 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1997) (comparative negligence), aff’d, 959 P.2d 651 (Wash. 1998). 
 171. See Eugene R. Erbstoesser, Bily’s Distinction Between Negligence and Negligent 
Misrepresentation, in PRACTISING LAW INST., ACCOUNTANTS’ LIABILITY 319, 322-24 (1993). 
 172. KPMG Peat Marwick v. Asher, 689 N.E.2d 1283, 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (apply-
ing Missouri law); Eldred v. McGladrey, Hendrickson & Pullen, 468 N.W.2d 218, 219-20 
(Iowa 1991); Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland (Raritan II), 407 S.E.2d 
178, 183 (N.C. 1991); Hendricks v. Thornton, 973 S.W.2d 348, 362-63 (Tex. App. 1998), su-
perceded by statute as stated in Prostok v. Browning, No. 05-99-00826-CV, 2003 Tex. App. 
LEXIS 2723 (Tex. App. Mar. 28, 2003); see also Erbstoesser, supra note 171. 
 173. Alten v. Atlantic Fin. Fed., 805 F. Supp. 5, 7 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (applying Pennsyl-
vania law) (imputing direct reliance when third party relied on the advice of its account-
ant, acting as the third party’s representative, who in turn relied on the report of the de-
fendant accountant); Bonhiver v. Graff, 248 N.W.2d 291, 299 (Minn. 1976) (holding that an 
accountant who supplied work papers to the insurance commissioner was liable to the in-
surance agent). 
 174. A disclaimer of opinion does not provide the basis for reliance that an unqualified 
opinion does. MacNerland v. Barnes, 199 S.E.2d 564, 566-67 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973) (finding 
no persuasive authority for upholding liability when there is “both [a] lack of privity and 
an uncertified statement or more particularly an express disclaimer”). When a qualifica-
tion is vague, however, courts might still hold accountants liable. See, e.g., R.I. Hosp. Trust 
Nat’l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847, 851-52 (4th Cir. 1972). 
When a disclaimer is inconsistent with the nature of the engagement, it is not given the 
same effect. See Kline v. First W. Gov’t Sec., 794 F. Supp. 542, 556 (E.D. Pa. 1992), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 24 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1994); First Nat’l Bank of Bluefield v. Crawford, 
386 S.E.2d 310, 314 (W. Va. 1989).  
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underlying section 552 is that liability for negligent misrepresenta-
tion is more restricted than liability for either intentional misrepre-
sentation (fraud) or for negligence that causes physical injury.175 Ac-
cordingly, the plaintiff must bring itself and its actions within the 
limiting requirements of section 552(2)(a) (the person for whose bene-
fit the information is supplied), and section 552(b) (the transaction 
for which it is supplied). 
 In the comments to section 552, the Restatement authors suggest 
that the limitations in the section rest on a balancing principle. The 
section embodies “a relative standard, which may be defined only in 
terms of the use to which the information will be put, weighed 
against the magnitude and probability of loss that might attend that 
use if the information proves to be incorrect.”176 Liability is only rea-
sonable when and to the extent that the accountant is aware of the 
potential risk, can engage in balancing, and can take due care in 
conducting the audit.177 
 The application of the double intent and knowledge requirement 
depends on how the courts interpret “intends” and “knows,” and the 
interpretations vary widely. The narrowest interpretation equates 
the knowledge requirement of section 552 with the intended benefi-
ciary requirement of contract law and the intent requirement of in-
tentional torts. The leading case articulating this position is the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court’s adoption of section 552 in Bily v. Arthur 
Young & Co., requiring that the accountant “has undertaken to in-
form and guide a third party with respect to an identified transaction 
or type of transaction.”178 
 The representation must have been made with the intent to in-
duce plaintiff, or a particular class of persons to which plaintiff be-
longs, to act in reliance upon the representation in a specific 
transaction, or a specific type of transaction, that defendant in-
tended to influence. Defendant is deemed to have intended to in-
fluence [its client’s] transaction with plaintiff whenever defendant 
knows with substantial certainty that plaintiff, or the particular 
class of persons to which plaintiff belongs, will rely on the repre-
sentation in the course of the transaction. If others become aware 
of the representation and act upon it, there is no liability even 
though defendant should reasonably have foreseen such a possibil-
ity.179 
                                                                                                                      
 175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. a (1977).  
 176. Id. 
 177. See id. § 552.  
 178. 834 P.2d 745, 769-70 (Cal. 1992). 
 179. Id. at 772-73; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8(A) (1965). 
 For interpretations of Bily, see Nutmeg Sec., Ltd. v. McGladrey & Pullen, 112 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 657 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), review denied No. S102583, 2002 Cal. LEXIS 336 (Cal. Jan. 16, 
2002); Mariani v. Price Waterhouse, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 675-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Ar-
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The Bily court limited the scope of the doctrine even further by hold-
ing that the question of the accountant’s intent is not necessarily to 
be determined as a question of fact; in the absence of “competent evi-
dence” that permits a “reasonable inference that the auditor supplied 
its report with knowledge of the existence of a specific transaction or 
a well-defined type of transaction which the report was intended to 
influence,” summary judgment is appropriate.180 
 Several courts require that the accountant have actual knowledge 
of the prospect of reliance without placing so much emphasis on in-
tent and direct undertaking of responsibility. As the court notes in 
Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co. v. Monco Agency Inc., the Restate-
ment distinguishes among the concepts “know,” “reason to know,” 
and “should know.”181 By using the specific term know in section 552, 
the Restatement drafters intended to convey a narrower standard 
than the types of constructive knowledge expressed in the other 
phrases and required actual knowledge on the part of the account-
ant.182 Even though an accountant knows that its audit report will be 
provided to a firm’s current lender, for example, it is not liable to a 
subsequent lender who is shown the report.183 Other courts apply this 
same standard,184 often finding that the accountant possessed suffi-
cient knowledge to impose liability.185  
 The scope of the intent or knowledge requirement is most at issue 
when the plaintiff is not identified individually in advance, but is a 
member of a group of persons who potentially may rely on the ac-
countant’s work. Limited partners of a limited partnership186 or 
shareholders of a corporation which is the accountant’s client,187 a 
                                                                                                                      
thur Andersen, L.L.P. v. Superior Court, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 879, 881-83 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); 
Industrial Indem. Co. v. Touche Ross & Co., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 29, 32-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
 180. 834 P.2d at 773. Bily itself involved such summary adjudication. 
 181. 719 F. Supp. 1328, 1331-32 (E.D. La. 1989), aff’d by First Nat’l Bank of Commerce 
v. Monco Agency, Inc., 911 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1990).  
 182. Id. at 1331-32 n.4.  
 183. Id. at 1334-36.  
 184. E.g., N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. LaPalme, 258 F.3d 35, 40 (1st Cir. 2001) (apply-
ing Massachusetts law); Kohala Agric. v. Deloitte & Touche, 949 P.2d 141, 163 (Haw. Ct. 
App. 1997); Nycal Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick, L.L.P., 688 N.E.2d 1368, 1372 (Mass. 
1998).  
 185. E.g., TCF Banking & Sav. v. Arthur Young & Co., 706 F. Supp. 1408, 1419 (D. 
Minn. 1988); First Fla. Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9, 15-16 (Fla. 1990); Bon-
hiver v. Graff, 248 N.W.2d 291, 298-99 (Minn. 1976). When the client designates several 
groups of relying third parties, the accountant owes a duty to every member of all of those 
groups. Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 677 So. 2d 409, 412 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). 
 186. Alten v. Atlantic Fin. Fed., 805 F. Supp. 5, 7 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Abbott v. Herzfeld & 
Rubin, P.C., 609 N.Y.S.2d 230, 232 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers 
& Lybrand, 436 N.E.2d 212, 215 (Ohio 1982). 
 187. Compare Simpson v. Specialty Retail Concepts, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 323, 331 
(M.D.N.C. 1995) (holding “public-market investors” can be foreseeable class of persons to 
whom an accountant’s duty extends), and Boykin v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 639 So. 2d 
504, 509 (Ala. 1994), and Murphy v. Campbell, 964 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Tex. 1997) (holding 
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specific lender,188 the corporation purchasing the accountant’s client 
corporation,189 existing trade creditors reflected on a firm’s financial 
statements,190 and customers of a securities broker191 have all been 
found to be within a known relying group. Courts have divided on 
whether prospective purchasers of the shares of a corporation192 and 
future lenders193 are too indeterminate a class to meet the require-
ments of section 552(2)(a) of the Restatement. 
 Under the second half of the Restatement’s intent or knowledge 
requirement, the accountant must know the type of transaction in 
which the reliance may occur. In most cases, this issue is closely re-
lated to the question of whether a third party is within the group of 
persons whom the accountant knows may rely on its report. If a com-
                                                                                                                      
stockholders can have individual cause of action against accountant they relied on if they 
were harmed), with Mariani v. Price Waterhouse, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 681 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1999) (holding “there are no ‘express third party beneficiaries’ of an ordinary, white-bread 
audit engagement contract. . . . only incidental beneficiaries who have no legal rights aris-
ing from the contract”), and Barger v. McCoy Hillard & Parks, 488 S.E.2d 215, 220 (N.C. 
1997) (holding shareholders could not bring suit against accountant because there were not 
individual claims distinct from claims against the corporation). 
 188. Cf. Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198 (Ga. 1987) (holding an auditor is only 
liable to a creditor if the auditor is actually aware the creditor will rely on the informa-
tion). 
 189. Mindis Acquisition Corp. v. BDO Seidman, L.L.P., 559 S.E.2d 111, 115 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2002), rev’d, 578 S.E.2d 400 (Ga. 2003). 
 190. Marcus Bros. Textiles, Inc. v. Price Waterhouse, L.L.P., 513 S.E.2d 320, 328 (N.C. 
1999) (holding there was sufficient evidence of knowledge and reliance to get past sum-
mary judgment); Blue Bell, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 715 S.W.2d 408, 413 
(Tex. App. 1986). 
 191. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Cheshier & Fuller, L.L.P., 262 B.R. 384, 400-01 
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2001). 
 192. Compare Oppenheimer-Palmieri Fund, L.P. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 812 F. 
Supp. 338, 357-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (deciding that there is no duty to potential purchasers of 
company known to be “in play”), and White v. BDO Seidman, L.L.P., 549 S.E.2d 490, 493 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2001), cert. denied, No. S01C1349, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 813 (Ga. Oct. 1, 2001) (re-
jecting “fraud on the market” theory), and Noram Inv. Servs., Inc. v. Stirtz Bernards Boy-
den Surdel & Larter, P.A., 611 N.W.2d 372, 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (broker who ex-
tended credit is not in the foreseeable class protected by the SEC’s reliance), and Lindner 
Fund v. Abney, 770 S.W.2d 437, 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (holding accountants are not li-
able to mutual fund advisors), and Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 
1974), with Scottish Heritable Trust, P.L.C. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 81 F.3d 606, 612-
14 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying Texas law), and In re Checkers Sec. Litig., 858 F. Supp. 1168, 
1180 (M.D. Fla. 1994), and Simpson v. Specialty Retail Concepts, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 323, 
331 (M.D.N.C. 1995), and Boykin v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 639 So. 2d 504, 509 (Ala. 
1994) (holding accountant liable to investors who used annual report to make investment 
decisions). For a case finding that the defendant accountant had different knowledge with 
respect to two different groups of plaintiffs, see In re SmarTalk Teleservice, Inc. Securities 
Litigation, 124 F. Supp. 2d 505 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (applying Massachusetts law). 
 193. Compare Bank of New Orleans and Trust Co. v. Monco Agency, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 
1328, 1333-36 (E.D. La. 1989), aff’d, First Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Monco Agency, Inc., 
911 F.2d 1053, 1063 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding accountant not liable to future lenders where 
accountant did not know the report would be used by the future lender), with Haberman v. 
Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d 1032, 1068 (Wash. 1987) (noting that the firm 
may have told the accountant that the report would be used to induce investors to pur-
chase bonds). 
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pany’s auditor is not liable to a prospective purchaser of stock who 
relies on the audit, usually the conclusion can be framed either as 
one involving a remote third party or a remote transaction. When a 
wholly different transaction occurs, the accountant will not be liable. 
When a transaction similar to that originally contemplated occurs, 
the analysis is likely to turn on the court’s perception of the knowl-
edge of the accountant vis-à-vis the particular party and transac-
tion.194 
 The most favorable interpretation of section 552 for plaintiffs 
shifts from requiring that the accountant actually know of the in-
tended reliance to allowing recovery where the accountant had rea-
son to know of the reliance. Using this interpretation, the rule ap-
proaches one of foreseeability. This approach is particularly relevant 
where the accountant’s knowledge need not arise from a specific con-
tact provided by its client or a third party, but may arise instead 
from the knowledge the accountant should have acquired from the 
audit itself. 
To allow liability to turn on the fortuitous occurrence that the ac-
countant’s client specifically mentions a person or class of persons 
who are to receive the reports, when the accountant may have that 
same knowledge as a matter of business practice, is too tenuous a 
distinction for us to adopt as a rule of law. Instead, we hold that if, 
under current business practices and the circumstances of that 
case, an accountant preparing audited financial statements knows 
or should know that such statements will be relied upon by a lim-
ited class of persons, the accountant may be liable for injuries to 
members of that class relying on his certification of the audited re-
ports.195  
III.   POLICY ANALYSIS OF AUDITOR LIABILITY 
 The history and present array of doctrines, and interpretations of 
these doctrines available to courts, suggest the twin problems that a 
court presented with an auditor liability case must face. First, which 
of the many available doctrines should the court apply? Courts which 
particularly disfavor liability generally adopt a privity or near privity 
requirement. Courts that favor expansive liability adopt negligence. 
                                                                                                                      
 194. See ML-Lee Acquisition Fund v. Deloitte & Touche, 463 S.E.2d 618 (S.C. Ct. App. 
1995), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 489 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1997). Compare Bank of New Or-
leans, 719 F. Supp. at 1333 (noting there was no knowledge of second lender although ac-
countant knew of first lender), with Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert, & Holland 
(Raritan I), 367 S.E.2d 609, 618 (N.C. 1988) (accountant knew the report would be used by 
prospective lenders).  
 195. Blue Bell, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 715 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Tex. App. 
1986), cited with approval in Raritan I, 367 S.E.2d at 614, and Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. 
Ernst & Whinney, 822 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Tenn. 1991). 
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Courts whose tendencies lie somewhere in between or are not clearly 
defined adopt negligent misrepresentation, typically as expressed in 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 552.196 Second, how should 
the court apply the doctrine it has selected? This process involves 
more than the simple or even complex application of law to facts. Ex-
cept for the particularly parsimonious Credit Alliance version of the 
near privity doctrine,197 none of the available doctrines are so clearly 
defined that they can be applied without considerably more thought 
by the courts. The variations in application of the Restatement test 
make this point most clearly. The same doctrinal formulation that is 
applied to require the functional equivalent of a third-party benefici-
ary relationship by the California court in Bily198 approaches a broad 
negligence standard grounded in foreseeability when applied by the 
North Carolina court in Raritan I.199  
 These twin problems comprise a quite common situation in the 
law, when doctrine breaks down, and a case, or a class of cases, can-
not be decided within the usual mode of doctrinal analysis. Doctrine 
presupposes an authoritative legal rule—such as section 552, made 
law by judicial adoption—that can be applied through a relatively 
logical, analytic process to decide a case.200 As is evident in the audi-
tor liability cases, doctrine does not dictate which rule (near privity, 
negligence, or misrepresentation) or which interpretation of an 
adopted rule (strict, broad, or in-between readings of the intent and 
knowledge requirement of section 552, for example) is authoritative. 
Instead, the controlling doctrine is, in the first instance, prescribed 
by and then interpreted through policy analysis. Policy analysis, as it 
is usually practiced in legal milieus from the first-year classroom, to 
law review articles, to courts of last resort (without much distinction 
among the settings, as it happens), is argument about the desirabil-
ity of a rule or outcome in terms of the social values of utility, right, 
morality, or legal institutional values such as judicial competence 
and administrability.201 
 The most common mode of policy analysis in auditor liability cases 
focuses on the particular type of situation presented by the cases (the 
reliance on a negligently prepared audit report by a lender, investor, 
or other third party), rather than including this type of case within a 
broader category or relating it to broader choices. From this perspec-
                                                                                                                      
 196. Few courts have even considered third-party beneficiary actions, which are widely 
used in other types of third-party liability cases. See FEINMAN, THIRD PARTIES, supra note 
16, at 31-44. 
 197. 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985).  
 198. 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992). 
 199. 367 S.E.2d at 609.  
 200. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIECLE) 97-105 
(1997). 
 201. Id. at 99. 
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tive, the principal focus of the analysis is the factual setting in which 
audits arise. More abstract principles or policies are relevant only to 
the extent that they are manifested in this setting. 
A.   Empirical Analysis 
 One possibility is that the policy analysis is essentially an empiri-
cal question. The choice between a broad and narrow liability rule, 
from this perspective, ultimately rests on determining the desirabil-
ity of one or the other as a matter of fact. Indeterminate liability, for 
example, either would impose such intolerable burdens on account-
ants that they would be forced to leave the market for auditing ser-
vices by the costs of insurance or liability judgments, or it would 
simply raise the cost of auditing services to an appropriate and bear-
able level, given the risks of liability to third parties.  
 The cases and commentary are filled with empirical statements of 
this sort, in the first instance probably culled from advocates’ briefs, 
but the paucity of citation to any serious investigations of the issue 
suggests that these statements are the products of typical legal em-
piricism—a “vivid imagination,” unencumbered by systematic in-
quiry.202 A substantial body of research does exist, but it is inconclu-
sive, providing modest support for each position, perhaps marginally 
more for the expansive position on liability. 
 As with other areas of the law in which the tort reform agenda 
has been advanced, the first empirical claim used by advocates of 
limited liability is that a flood of litigation and the prospect of large 
and particularly indeterminate litigation is increasing liability costs 
and insurance premiums at a rate that threatens the viability of ac-
counting firms. Claims certainly have been increasing.203 Claims by 
third parties for negligent auditing are not the most numerous type 
of claim, but they are the most expensive.204 The greater proportion of 
claims arise from accountants’ tax practice and other non-audit ser-
vices, not from the conduct of audits;205 among audit claims, about 
one-half come from the client and one-half from third parties.206 
However, audit claims are threatening because of their size. For ex-
ample, for one insurer, yearly tax claims in 2000 averaged $105,000, 
while audit claims averaged $341,000.207 
                                                                                                                      
 202. Stewart Macaulay, The Reliance Interest and the World Outside the Law Schools’ 
Doors, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 247, 285. 
 203.  Sherry Anderson & Joseph Wolfe, Accountants’ Liability: Where are Claims Com-
ing From?, OHIO CPA J., Oct.-Dec. 2001, at 21.  
 204. Id. at 23.  
 205. Id.  
 206. Id. 
 207. John F. Raspante & Ric Rosario, Understanding and Minimizing CPA Liability, 
CPA J., May 2001, at 19, 20-21. 
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 The size of liability costs and the insurance premiums that are a 
proxy for them is not the central issue. Rather, the issues are 
whether the liability costs are sufficiently predictable such that ac-
counting firms can price audits to account for them, and whether the 
liability costs assessed are an appropriate reflection of auditor error. 
The research suggests there is some reason to believe that even audi-
tors operating under the relative uncertainty of a negligence regime 
properly price audit services consistent with the risk of possible 
losses, although litigation risk is less of a factor in audit pricing than 
are other factors, such as the size of the client and its operating com-
plexity.208 Much of the increase in cost in riskier engagements may be 
attributable to auditors’ tendencies to respond to higher risks by de-
voting more personnel, time, and effort to the audit.209 This response 
reduces the expected litigation cost, both by decreasing the probabil-
ity of error and by reducing the probability of an adverse judgment in 
the event of litigation.210 The resulting higher fees are ordinarily suf-
ficient to cover any eventual litigation costs.211  
 The relative predictability of litigation costs provides a basis for 
questioning the indeterminacy of liability. There is further evidence 
that the imposition of liability is not simply the allocation of respon-
sibility to the deepest pocket. It is true that there is an “expectations 
gap”212 between the public, at least as reflected in potential jurors, 
and the technical limitations on the audit.213 In one study, sixty-four 
percent of those asked agreed that “[t]he purpose of an audit is to un-
cover any type of fraud or wrongdoing,” and sixty-three percent be-
lieved that “[a]ccountants have the responsibility to police the finan-
cial reporting a company makes to investors.”214 Yet, there are no 
conclusive findings about the role or the merits of litigation in de-
termining the incidence of suits against accountants and the out-
comes of such suits.215 At least in securities litigation, plaintiffs ap-
pear to be selective in including auditors as defendants; dismissals 
and defendant victories account for an expected forty to fifty percent 
of the cases, and auditors are generally only secondary contributors 
to the amounts actually paid to plaintiffs.216 
                                                                                                                      
 208. See Dan A. Simunic & Michael T. Stein, The Impact of Litigation Risk on Audit 
Pricing: A Review of the Economics and the Evidence, 15 AUDITING: A J. OF PRAC. & THE-
ORY 119 (Supp. 1996). 
 209. Id. at 130.  
 210. Id. at 132.  
 211. Id.  
 212. See Pacini et al., supra note 15, at 355. 
 213. Raspante & Rosario, supra note 207, at 21.  
 214. Id. 
 215. Zoe-Vonna Palmrose, Audit Litigation Research: Do the Merits Matter? An As-
sessment and Directions for Future Research, 16 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 355, 369 (1997). 
 216. Id. at 363-64.  
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 The effect of these factors may be reflected in liability insurance 
premium rates. According to the Insurance Information Institute, 
malpractice premiums for some accounting firms increased as much 
as thirty to one hundred percent in 2000-2001.217 But premium rates 
may be more connected to the business cycle than to the prospect of 
liability. Insurers typically set rates low to attract business and pre-
miums when their expected return on investment is high, with less 
regard for the underwriting loss that may occur. As recently as the 
late 1990s, insurance was freely available at falling rates because the 
projected return on investment in the bull-market was high.218 To the 
extent that premium rates are related to risk, they reward those 
firms which exercise care; even at the downturn of the business cycle, 
premium rates hold steady and even fall for firms with little or no 
experience of malpractice.219 
 The empirical evidence relevant to auditor liability is far from 
conclusive, but even if it was it would hardly resolve the question. 
The empirical evidence requires interpretation. For example, several 
studies have demonstrated, not surprisingly, a significant positive 
correlation between the financial distress of a company, measured by 
the probability of bankruptcy, and the incidence of litigation against 
auditors.220 Some researchers suggest that this correlation demon-
strates that much litigation against auditors is meritorious because 
managers’ incentives to mislead increase and reporting problems are 
more likely when a firm is in distress.221 Other researchers believe 
that the correlation indicates a lack of merit in auditor litigation 
since the lack of financial resources by the firm leaves the auditor as 
the prominent potential defendant with deep pockets.222  
B.   The Paradigm Case of Auditor Liability 
 The dispute about the proper scope of liability for auditors, then, 
is a normative question, not an empirical question. Auditors have a 
dual responsibility to management and to third-party users of the 
audit, but which of these roles is primary? Most fundamentally, how 
is the conflict to be resolved between the values of private ordering 
and the values of public ordering? 
                                                                                                                      
 217. John M. Covaleski & Roger Russell, Special Services Prove to Be a “Premium” 
Malpractice Concern, ACCT. TODAY, July 23, 2001, at 1, 44. 
 218. Kristin L. Nelson, Malpractice Insurors Battle for Accounting Firm Dollars, ACCT. 
TODAY, July 27-Aug. 9, 1998, at 5, 39. 
 219. Covaleski & Russell, supra note 217, at 44. 
 220. See Palmrose, supra note 215, at 367-68. 
 221. Thomas Lys & Ross L. Watts, Lawsuits Against Auditors, 32 J. ACCT. RES. 65, 68 
(1994). 
 222. James D. Stice, Using Financial and Market Information to Identify Pre-
engagement Factors Associated with Lawsuits Against Auditors, 66 ACCT. REV. 516, 521 
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 In the paradigm case of accountant liability,223 the client retains 
the accountant specifically to prepare an audit report to be furnished 
to an investor or lender who requires audited financial statements as 
a condition of making an investment or loan. The accountant con-
ducts the audit for that specific, identified purpose, knowing that the 
audit report will be relied on by a particular third party, and fur-
nishes a copy of the audit report to the third party. 
 A consensus exists among the jurisdictions on the proper treat-
ment of the paradigm case. When an accountant conducts an audit 
for a specific, identified purpose and furnishes the audit report to a 
particular third party who is expected to rely on it, the accountant 
owes the third party a duty of reasonable care in performing the au-
dit and reporting its results. The consensus imposition of liability in 
the paradigm case results from two factors which are central to the 
policy analysis. 
 First, in performing the audit, the accountant has a dual role: to 
provide information to the third party as well as to its client.224 An 
audit has two purposes: to provide information to the management of 
a company about the effectiveness of its internal accounting system 
and the accuracy of the information the system produces, and to pro-
vide to third persons an independent evaluation of the company’s fi-
nancial statements and the process that produced them.225 The com-
pany’s management needs to know, for its own purposes in running 
the firm, what its financial condition is and whether the systems in 
place to produce accurate financial information are suitable.226 Third 
persons, such as present or potential lenders, investors, creditors, or 
regulators, also need to know the firm’s financial condition, and they 
need the assurance that the financial statements reliably mean what 
they say.227 In the paradigm case, the dual elements of the auditor’s 
role do not generate inconsistent duties because the client intends 
that the audit will serve the third party’s interest. 
 Second, the scope of liability that would result from the account-
ant’s negligence is relatively predictable. The accountant knows both 
the identity of the third party who will rely on the audit and the ex-
tent of the third party’s reliance. When the audit is prepared for a 
                                                                                                                      
 223. On the concept of paradigms in law, see Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of 
Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661, 696-717 (1989). 
 224.  Courts at different ends of the liability spectrum have often recognized that a 
primary benefit of the audit is to third parties. E.g., Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 
745, 751 (Cal. 1992); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 149 (N.J. 1983), super-
ceded by statute as stated in Finderne Mgmt. Co. v. Barrett, 809 A.2d 857 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2002).  
 225. See DONALD H. TAYLOR & G. WILLIAM GLEZEN, AUDITING: INTEGRATED CONCEPTS 
AND PROCEDURES 10-12 (1979). 
 226. Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 149.  
 227. Id.  
54  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:17 
 
potential lender to the audited company, for example, the accountant 
knows the size of the loan and therefore can predict the loss that the 
lender will incur if the audit negligently fails to reveal that the com-
pany is not credit-worthy. Accordingly, the accountant can take ap-
propriate precautions to prevent the loss or to insure against it. 
C.   Divergent Approaches 
 Beyond the paradigm case, the agreement on the policy analysis of 
auditors’ liability breaks down. The analysis splits into two distinct 
approaches, one disfavoring and one favoring liability. 
1.   Limited Liability 
 The argument for limited liability begins with defining the limits 
of the auditor’s role.228 Lenders and investors may take an audit re-
port as indicating that nothing is amiss in the financial affairs of a 
company.229 “[T]here sometimes seems to be the expectation that an 
audit should disclose all misuse of corporate assets, fraud, and any il-
legal acts or irregularities, and that a clean opinion means that the 
audit client is and will continue to be a successful and profitable op-
eration.”230 Even an unqualified audit report, however, does not 
guarantee that the financial statements are entirely accurate, that 
the client has not committed fraud in their preparation, or that the 
company’s financial past is a reliable predictor of its future. The cli-
ent prepares its own financial statements and assumes primary re-
sponsibility for their contents, while the accountant’s responsibility 
is secondary.231 Moreover, auditing is not a mechanical process,232 and 
an audit report is not an objective statement of fact. Rather, “an au-
dit report is a professional opinion based on numerous and complex 
factors.”233 In its opinion, therefore, the accountant only states that it 
has exercised competence, due care, and independence in the conduct 
of the audit to determine that the financial statements fairly present 
the condition of the company.234 As the California court colorfully 
summarized in Bily: 
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 An auditor is a watchdog, not a bloodhound. As a matter of 
commercial reality, audits are performed in a client-controlled en-
vironment. . . . 
 . . . . 
 Moreover, an audit report is not a simple statement of verifiable 
fact that, like the weight of the load of beans in Glanzer v. 
Shepard, can be easily checked against uniform standards of in-
disputable accuracy. . . . [T]he report is based on the auditor’s in-
terpretation and application of hundreds of professional standards, 
many of which are broadly phrased and readily subject to different 
constructions. Although ultimately expressed in shorthand form, 
the report is the final product of a complex process involving dis-
cretion and judgment on the part of the auditor at every stage.235 
 While a lender or investor must rely on the client and the ac-
countant for financial statements, a sophisticated third party can 
deal with the risk of financial irregularities in ways other than pure 
reliance on the audited financial statements.236 The third party may 
be as expert in evaluating the client’s affairs as is the accountant, al-
though it uses different means to do so. The third party can obtain 
other data about the client, its principals, and its prospects; inquiries 
of financial reporting services and financial entities which deal with 
the client are common. A large commercial bank contemplating a 
loan, for example, will demand to see audited financial statements, 
but the bank has numerous other methods that it regularly uses to 
ascertain the credit risk of a potential borrower.237 If it has concerns, 
the bank can obtain more information from the borrower or from 
third parties. It can also bargain to reduce its risks by receiving an 
increased rate of interest, additional security, personal guarantees, 
or other advantageous contract terms.238 To the extent that every 
transaction entails some risk, and some transactions more than oth-
ers, the lender calculates the risk as one of the ordinary costs of en-
gaging in its line of business. Audit failure is one of the risks of bank-
ing as much as of accountancy.239 
 Because of the multiple sources of information available to the 
third party, difficulties can arise in determining the actual extent of 
the third party’s reliance on the report.240 Sometimes the report will 
clearly be a crucial factor inducing the reliance, but more often it will 
only be one among many factors that provides the third party with 
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the assurance that it needs to proceed.241 When the third party suf-
fers a loss, it faces a moral hazard. There is a significant temptation 
for an injured party to attempt to attach liability to the accountant 
because it may be the only solvent potential defendant available.242 
These cases present particularly challenging proof problems because 
the plaintiff’s claim of reliance on the accountant’s opinion often may 
rest on no more than the plaintiff’s testimony to that effect.243  
 Beyond the auditor’s limited role in relation to third parties, the 
indeterminacy of liability in situations other than the paradigm case 
makes it undesirable to expand liability. The threat of imposing 
open-ended liability on a defendant has been one of the central con-
cerns of courts in accountant liability cases since the beginning, re-
ceiving its authoritative expression in Ultramares.244 In that case, 
Cardozo argued that liability for negligence “may expose accountants 
to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time 
to an indeterminate class.”245 
 The concept is appropriately named because the key problem of 
indeterminate liability is one of indeterminacy or uncertainty. It is 
not simply a problem of the large size of the damages the accountant 
may have to pay. Instead, the problem of indeterminacy is a problem 
of the spreading out or rippling down of harm caused by the defen-
dant’s negligence.246 First, liability expands to an uncertain number 
of parties as the class of potential plaintiffs expands from those spe-
cifically known to the accountant, to those known only as members of 
a class, to those who are only foreseeable.247 Second, the extent of li-
ability is uncertain because the losses of each plaintiff depend on in-
dividual facts not within the knowledge or control of the account-
ant.248 
 The threat of indeterminate liability is particularly acute in ac-
countant liability cases because the consequences of a negligent audit 
report can extend very far, unlike the consequences of a negligent act 
causing physical injury.249 The consequences of a physical accident 
can be catastrophic, but they tend to be limited in space and time to 
the immediate victims.250 The economic consequences of a negligent 
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audit, on the other hand, can extend along chains of causation to 
many persons far removed in time and contact from the account-
ant.251 Once an audit report is issued, it can be disseminated widely 
and relied on by members of the general public. The rippling of con-
sequences is particularly likely to occur today since information can 
be passed quickly and costlessly from person to person (and often to 
many persons at once) in ways over which the accountant has no con-
trol. 
 In this way, indeterminate liability imposes an unfair burden on 
the accountant. The expanded liability of the accountant may be to-
tally out of proportion to its fault in bringing about the harm of 
which the third party complains.252 In many cases, the company 
which is the accountant’s client is insolvent, so the search for poten-
tial defendants will focus on the accountant’s deep pockets.253 
 Although the auditor’s role in the financial reporting process is 
secondary and the subject of complex professional judgment, the 
liability it faces in a negligence suit by a third party is primary 
and personal and can be massive. The client, its promoters, and its 
managers have generally left the scene, headed in most cases for 
government-supervised liquidation or the bankruptcy court. The 
auditor has now assumed center stage as the remaining solvent 
defendant and is faced with a claim for all sums of money ever 
loaned to or invested in the client. Yet the auditor may never have 
been aware of the existence, let alone the nature or scope, of the 
third party transaction that resulted in the claim.254 
 In theory, the accountant is compensated in its professional fee, 
not only for the cost of providing its services, but also for the risk 
that it will have to compensate third parties if the services are negli-
gently performed.255 However, because the information the account-
ant purveys is potentially useful to many third parties who deal with 
the client in many different situations, it may be difficult for the ac-
countant to assess properly the extent of its potential responsibility 
to all of those third parties,256 and then either conform its conduct to 
the potential scope of the loss, or capture the value of the information 
in its price by including a premium for the risk of liability.257 
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 On the other hand, just as some sophisticated third parties have 
readily available means of obtaining information about the client and 
controlling the risk of their interactions with it, so too, many third 
parties are in as good or better a position than the accountant to bear 
the risk of losses posed by problem clients.258 For a lender or investor 
who regularly engages in transactions of the kind at issue, the risk of 
default can be viewed as the risk of the accountant’s failure to dis-
cover the difficulty and reveal it to the third party, or it can be 
viewed as the risk of client fraud or failure due to unforeseen circum-
stances. If the latter, the risk of default by the client can be figured 
into the cost of the financing it provides as easily as it can be figured 
into the accountant’s fee.  
 Expanded liability produces little more incentive for accountants 
to exercise care because they already have sufficient incentives to 
audit with due care.259 These incentives include malpractice liability 
to the client, sanctions by regulators in securities cases or other regu-
lated matters, concern for reputation, and the threat of professional 
disciplinary proceedings.260 Even when liability imposes an additional 
incentive, an accountant may have limited ability to increase the 
quality of its auditing practices. Because auditing is a labor-intensive 
activity, the only means of improving quality—by adding personnel-
time—is likely to have minimal returns once a reasonable level has 
been achieved.261  
 Stated most generally, indeterminate liability and liability out of 
proportion to fault undermine what would otherwise be an efficient 
process of private ordering.262 The private-ordering principle assumes 
that individuals are the best judges of their own interests. Accord-
ingly, parties are better able to prospectively determine the desirable 
level of care and the appropriate means of distributing losses in the 
event of audit failure than a court can do retrospectively. A third 
party can choose to rely on the accountant’s audit, and therefore take 
the risk that the audit has been negligently performed, or it can 
moderate that risk by commissioning its own audit, looking to other 
sources of financial information, bargaining for better security or 
more favorable terms with the client, or requiring the client to have 
the accountant give specific assurances to the third party, thereby 
bringing itself within a narrow rule of liability.263 Therefore, liability 
should be limited to cases in which the third party fits within the 
paradigm case, and principles that are grounded in contract law, not 
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tort law, provide the appropriate basis of liability.264 
2.   Expanded Liability 
 The argument for expanded liability also begins with the auditor’s 
dual role, but it emphasizes the accountant’s public responsibility in 
that role.265 The audit has long had dual purposes, but its use by per-
sons other than the company’s management has become increasingly 
important.266 In Ultramares, consistent with the prevailing view of 
auditing at the time, Cardozo regarded the auditor’s report as “pri-
marily for the benefit of the [auditor’s client], a convenient instru-
mentality for use in the development of the business, and only inci-
dentally or collaterally for the use of those to whom [the company] 
might exhibit it thereafter.”267 As the reaction to Arthur Andersen’s 
participation in the Enron debacle has made clear, today that view is 
regarded as outmoded.268 For those who deal with companies large 
and small, the audit report provides assurance that things are what 
they appear to be. As Comptroller General David M. Walker stated 
after Enron, making special reference to the auditor’s role in the fi-
nancial markets:  
 The audit is a critical element of the financial reporting struc-
ture because it subjects information in the financial statements to 
independent and objective scrutiny, increasing the reliability and 
assurance that can be placed on those financial statements for effi-
cient allocation of resources in a capital market where investors 
are dependent on timely and reliable information . . . . The audi-
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tor’s opinion on the financial statements is like an expert’s stamp 
of approval to the public and the capital markets.269 
 The accountant fulfills its public responsibility in its role as an in-
dependent professional. As a professional, the accountant must be 
competent and must perform the audit with due care. As an inde-
pendent professional, the accountant must be impartial in fact and in 
appearance to the interests of the client and to the interests of those 
persons who will rely on the financial statements.270 Auditors must 
be “independent expert professionals who have neither mutual [in-
terests] nor conflicts of interests in connection with the entities they 
are auditing” and must “bring to the financial reporting process in-
tegrity, independence, objectivity, and technical competence.”271 
 The requirements of competence, due care, and independence are 
primary among the Generally Accepted Auditing Standards272 and 
Code of Professional Conduct,273 standards that the accounting pro-
fession has defined for itself. The federal securities laws and related 
regulatory requirements are important sources of accountant obliga-
tions in transactions involving large, public companies. In many 
other settings, from large commercial loans to much smaller invest-
ments, the requirement of an audit report has become ubiquitous. As 
such, it is part of the customary practice in the financial arena, and 
is specifically planned into transactions by the parties. 
 Other sources such as these are important in defining the ac-
countant’s responsibility, but they are less effective than tort liability 
in enforcing that responsibility. Although the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants, and state licensing authorities have the formal authority 
to discipline accountants, that authority is rarely exercised.274 Lim-
ited resources and professional protectionism combine to minimize 
the risk of regulatory action against accountants who have been neg-
ligent, or worse, in the conduct of audits.275 
 The public dimension of the auditor’s role, therefore, induces third 
parties to rely on the audit. Reliance is particularly likely where the 
third party has no access to the company’s financial information, 
other than through management, no check on their accuracy, other 
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than the auditor’s report, or has limited access to other sources of in-
formation about the financial position of the auditor’s client. 
 As this point suggests, third parties are differently situated to an-
ticipate and deal with the risk of audit failure and with the more 
fundamental risk of error or fraud by the client in supplying financial 
information to the third party. From the perspective of liability-
limiting courts from Ultramares onward, the third party in the para-
digm case who is able to extract from the client the concession that 
the audit is expressly conducted, in part, for the third party’s benefit, 
so that the accountant focuses on the third party’s prospective reli-
ance, is most worthy of protection.276 But from the perspective of the 
liability-expanding approach, this is exactly backwards. The party 
who has less leverage, or is somewhat removed from the audit, is 
most in need of being able to rely on the accuracy of the audit be-
cause that party is unable to demand a specially-prepared audit, 
rather than relying on a preexisting routine audit, or to have access 
to other sources of information. The typical investor or creditor, for 
example, cannot acquire information other than through the audited 
financial statements or obtain adequate security to ameliorate the 
risk of a negligent audit.277 
 In some of these cases, the auditor will not have specific knowl-
edge of the potential for reliance by individual third parties. This 
lack of knowledge presents the prospect of indeterminate liability. It 
is this prospect that causes courts adopting the liability-limiting view 
to deny liability.278 But indeterminacy is not a significant problem in 
most accountant liability cases. With respect to the number of poten-
tial plaintiffs, even the foreseeability test, the broadest doctrine used 
in such cases, limits liability to plaintiffs who were known or who 
reasonably could have been predicted to potentially rely on the ac-
countant’s report.279 Accordingly, the reasonable accountant will be 
able to predict the kinds of parties to whom it may be liable, even 
though it may not know their identity. The accountant is only liable 
to third parties who should have been reasonably foreseen at the 
time of the audit, the usual standard in the law of negligence.280 As 
long as the accountant is only liable for foreseeable uses of its report, 
the accountant will be able to predict the scope of potential loss be-
cause it will know, or should know, the potential scope of the trans-
actions involved.  
 In most cases, there is a natural limit on the potential scope of li-
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ability that arises from the size of the firm being audited and the na-
ture of its activities.281 Nearly all cases arise from the extension of 
credit to the firm or equity investments in the firm. The capacity of a 
firm to absorb additional debt or equity is generally predictable 
within a range based on its current size and the scope of its current 
business, which are, of course, known to the accountant. 
 The responsibility of the accountant to such parties is a matter of 
fairness as well as risk. The accountant is not solely responsible for 
the harm to the third party—fraud or mismanagement by the client 
is the underlying cause—but the third party is probably not respon-
sible for the harm at all. Ordinarily, when one party is totally inno-
cent and one party is partially blameworthy, the law favors shifting 
the loss away from the innocent party.282 However, if the third party 
is partly responsible for the loss because it acted negligently, then 
comparative negligence may be appropriate.283 If the third party is 
not responsible but other parties are—such as lawyers and under-
writers–then comparative negligence ensures that the accountant 
bears no more than its proportional share of the third party’s loss.284 
 At its most general level, the argument for expanded liability em-
phasizes the accountant’s responsibility to third parties more than it 
values the process of private ordering.285 This responsibility arises 
from third parties’ reliance on the audit and the risks that the negli-
gent conduct of the audit creates for them. The focus on private or-
dering is deficient because it does not take adequate account of these 
kinds of reliance and risks, nor does it recognize that some third par-
ties are not in a position to take advantage of private ordering. The 
result is that tort principles are needed to supplement contract prin-
ciples in these cases.286 
IV.   UNDERSTANDING THE DIVERGENT POLICY APPROACHES 
 Thus, there are two alternative policy analyses of the scope of 
auditor liability: one narrowing liability only to those in privity or an 
equivalent relationship with the auditor; the other extending liability 
to parties not specifically identified and, perhaps, only foreseen. The 
situation thereby presented to courts is as common as it is peculiar 
because the alternative analyses are, to a considerable extent, irrec-
oncilable. Either the public half of the auditor’s dual role is secon-
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dary, so that only identified third parties should rely on it, or the 
public half is sufficiently prominent, so that foreseeable third parties 
should be able to rely on it. Either such deleterious consequences 
flow from indeterminate liability that only identified third parties 
can recover,287 or liability to foreseeable third parties is not so inde-
terminate that it imposes unfair and socially suboptimal burdens on 
accountants.288 Most fundamentally, accountant liability should pro-
ceed on a private-ordering principle that leads to limited liability or 
on a public-ordering principle that leads to expanded liability. 
 As this survey of the law demonstrates, courts and scholars who 
seriously consider the issue reach opposite conclusions on the norma-
tive questions and the resulting desirable rule of law. Many of the 
opinions described in this Article review the history and authorities, 
weigh the policies, and then firmly conclude that one solution or the 
other is the only sound one. And they do so with a degree of certainty 
that is strange, given the contested nature of the issue.  
 One could characterize the dispute embodied in the auditor liabil-
ity issue as a conflict between a “conservative” liability-limiting view 
and a “liberal” liability-expanding view. “Liberal” and “conservative” 
are not strictly defined terms, and the elements of a liberal or con-
servative position are not logically entailed, but there is a familiar 
coherence among the elements of each position based on history, poli-
tics, and culture. This coherence makes it possible, and even appro-
priate, to characterize the liability-limiting position as conservative, 
and the liability-expanding position as liberal.  
 It is interesting to characterize the competing positions in this 
way, if for no other reason than to avoid losing sight of the fact that 
the choice being made is not purely “legal,” and is, in some sense, 
“political.” However, it may be more useful to connect the policy 
choice of auditor liability to a central issue in modern private law: 
the conflict between contractarian and relational approaches. 
 The contractarian approach embodies the private-ordering princi-
ple.289 It emphasizes the contractual origins of the relationships that 
give rise to the cases and asserts that liability should ordinarily be 
imposed only when the narrow standards of contract law are met, in-
cluding, in the case of claims by a third party, the standards of third-
party beneficiary law.  
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 Every case arises from a contractual setting. The parties allocate 
the costs, benefits, and risks of their interaction through this con-
tracting process, sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly. The 
law’s role in this process is to support the parties’ private ordering by 
using contract law, including third-party beneficiary law, to fulfill 
the parties’ expectations by enforcing the contracts as the parties 
have made them. When the courts impose liability beyond the con-
tract, it upsets the parties’ own allocation of rights and duties, dimin-
ishes their ability to regulate their own affairs, introduces inefficien-
cies into the process, and raises the threat of indeterminate liability.  
 Liability should only be imposed beyond that prescribed by con-
tract law when the private-ordering process is inadequate. The prin-
cipal instance of inadequacy is accidental physical harm, when con-
tracting ex ante is unavailable. Even then, to protect individual 
autonomy, liability should be imposed only on the basis of fault, and 
not to achieve broader policy objectives. In economic loss cases, con-
tract law is better suited than tort law for the redress of harm,290 ex-
cept in the event of fraud, which is a subversion of contracting prin-
ciples.291 
 The relational approach, on the other hand, builds on extra-
contractual elements of the parties’ relationships and employs a pub-
lic-ordering principle to stress the responsibility that arises from 
causing harm to another.292 From this expanded perspective, the 
law’s role is not limited to enforcement of the express terms of the 
parties’ contracts. The express terms must be supplemented by fac-
tors from the context and by concern for policies not adequately cap-
tured in the concept of enforcing the parties’ contracts. In the rela-
tional approach, the law has values to serve in addition to effectuat-
ing the parties’ explicit planning—particularly the values of respon-
sibility for reliance induced or harm caused that are expressed in tort 
policies. Accordingly, tort liability is an appropriate supplement to li-
ability based on contract law, and tort and contract law do not occupy 
entirely separate realms.  
 The choice of a position on auditor liability is in this way tied into 
choices on other private law issues. In this context, the choice be-
tween the liability-limiting and liability-expanding positions on audi-
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tor liability can be seen as ideological.293 The issues at stake extend 
far beyond the question of auditor liability. The contractarian and re-
lational approaches are applied across a range of situations, and the 
decision in one type of case, such as accountant liability, resonates 
with decisions made in many others. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 There is a formulaic structure to law review articles that deal 
with doctrinal issues (rather than articles that are primarily histori-
cal, jurisprudential, or otherwise theoretical). A law review article 
identifies a problem in doctrine that arises from a new situation, a 
gap in the rule system, or an arguably unsatisfactory result in a case 
or line of cases. It surveys the background and current state of affairs 
in the area of law relevant to the problem. It concludes by resolving 
the problem. The resolution may be achieved by a clever manipula-
tion of the doctrine (a form that was particularly prevalent through 
the middle of the twentieth century), by the use of policy analysis, or 
by the application of some other approach, such as economic analysis. 
This survey of the conflicting positions arrived at by the many courts 
and scholars that have addressed the issue of auditor liability ren-
ders adherence to that formula an act of hubris. Instead, the aim of 
this Article has been to describe the controversy, to explore its rami-
fications, and to situate it within the context of modern private law. 
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